Pre-ISA Workshop

**Rationality and Emotion:
From Weber through Habermas
to a Post-Confucian Search for a Balance**

4월 28일(토) 14:00~18:00

중민사회이론연구재단
Joongmin Foundation for Social Theory

Special Workshop

" *Rationality and Emotion :*
From Weber through Habermas
to a Post-Confucian Search for a Balance "

Weber's Concept of Richtigkeitsrationalitaet and Rationality of Compathy:
The Case of Filial Piety and Funeral Ritual Reform in China
Sang-Jin HAN Seoul National University, South Korea

How Do Rationality and Empathy Deal with "Well-Being" and
"Well-Dying" in Organ Transplant and Life-Prolonging Medication?
Yoshihide SAKURAI Hokkaido University, Japan

Rationality in Practice Theory:
Implications on Qing and Li Theory of Social Organization
Joo-Hyun CHO Keimyung University, South Korea

Weberian Approach to the Theology of Yong-Gi Cho
Hong-Jung KIM Seoul National University, South Korea

Some Considerations on Max Weber's theory of 'Rationality'
Song-U CHON Hanyang University, South Korea

* Free Discussion

※ 언어: 영어

- **Time: Saturday, April 28, 2018** (from 14:00 to 18:00)
- **Venue: Seminar Room, JMF**
- **Host:**

중민사회이론연구재단
Joongmin Foundation for Social Theory

한국이론사회학회
Korean Society for Social Theory

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Revisiting Weber and Habermas on Rationality and Compathy from Asian Perspectives

HAN Sang-Jin
(Session Organizer)

Session Abstract

The social theory of rationality faces double challenges today: the apparent limits of instrumental-scientific rationality firmly institutionalized in modern systems on the one hand, and the upsurge of emotion in politics and everyday life as exemplified by Brexit, Trump syndromes and various populist movements in the world, on the other. In this context, Habermas has opened up the space for a rational discourse on normative-practical issues and, as such, represents a significant innovative response to these challenges. However, it still remains uncertain how to treat emotion in general and compathy (共感) in particular when we construct a social theory of rationality. Compathy means common feelings deeply rooted in history and widely shared by its actors. The fact that human behaviors are fundamentally shaped by emotions calls for a new approach to the relation of rationality to emotion, particularly to compathy. Like common sense, compathy may work as a rational basis of politics and social organization in the 21st century. This is why the session revisits Weber and Habermas with three objectives: 1) to examine how they dealt with the relation between rationality and compathy; 2) to introduce the Asian focus of rationality on the balance of emotion (情: *qing*) and reason (理: *li*), as expressed in such popular notions as *qlingli* rationality, *qingli* society, and *qingli* politics; and, finally 3) to explore the possible converging elements in conceptualizing the role of compathy as an important characteristic of second modern rationality.

Regular Session

Title: Weber's Concept of Richtigkeitsrationalitaet and Rationality of Compathy: The Case of Filial Piety and Funeral Ritual Reform in China

Keywords: Habermas, Qingli relation, Weber and compathy

Sang-Jin HAN, Seoul National University, South Korea

Abstract: Weber proposed different sets of ideal-typical conceptualization of rationality which have made great contributions to a social theory of rationality. Yet the limit of the Weberian paradigm is also clear as epitomized by the destructive consequences of instrumental (purposive) rationality prevailing in modern systems today. However, Weber kept the term 'Richtigkeitsrationalitaet' in his 1913 article on the categories of interpretive sociology. Here 'richtig' may mean 'correct or common' as widely shared, deeply rooted, and thus anticipatable. This paper attempts to go back to this concept, as an undifferentiated ground concept of rationality, to clarify where Weber's analytic work started from and explore what, despite his great contribution, we have lost because of his preoccupation with analytic clarity of the concepts at the cost of the profound significance of this ground concept. One key problem is the rationality of normative claims. Habermas has attempted to solve this problem by his theory of communication and discursive testing. Another problem is related to emotion in general and compathy in particular. This paper will show how the issue of compathy is deeply built into Weber's concept of *Richtigkeitsrationalitaet* and how we can possibly deal with this issue from the perspective of rationality. For this purpose, this paper will examine the Chinese concept of *Qingli* relation (Qing means emotion or context, Li means reason) and explore its possible rationality by a case study of the funeral ritual reform policy taken by the Communist Party and the popular response to it from the ethical perspective of filial piety as a vivid example of compathy.

Regular Session

Title: How Do Rationality and Empathy Deal with "Well-Being" and "Well-Dying" in Organ Transplant and Life-Prolonging Medication?

Keywords: life-prolong medication, organ transplantation, well-being and well-dying

Yoshihide SAKURAI, Hokkaido University, Japan

Abstract: Weber's typological theory of means-end rational, value-rational, affectional, and tradition has so far been taught as major sociological theory at university education. However, present behavioral economics and evolutional psychology teach us that means-end rational decision is also based on heuristics and emotion which have innately been constructed in human evolution. If we looked at various aspects of our life and death in secular and religious lives, we would know the interactive boundary between rationality and empathy.

In this paper I will first illustrate the brief history of organ transplantation and its current condition in Japan, in which most Japanese people hardly recognized the medical and legal definition of brain death and felt conflicted over donating families' living organ and staying with dying family until they stop breathing and suffer cardiac arrest. Medical experts and mass media revealingly tried to convince the public about the means-end rationality of altruistic organ donation. However, a few Japanese religions opposed organ transplantation from their religious perspectives. The second example is life-prolonging treatment relying on artificial breathing and nutrition by gastrostomy tube and central vein infusion at hospital and nursing care home for the elderly. Increasing longevity in Japan may cause a rise in anxiety among Japanese people, as they are getting more worried about taking care of their elder parents, exhausting own living expense in their 80s and 90s, and suffering from dementia. Recently, the concept of dignified death and national death have been discussed among ordinary people who begin to prepare in advance for the directive of medication and funeral in the end of their life time. "Well-dying" could be an important topic in both private and public sphere, involving rational and empathic decision and interaction among concerned people in Japan.

Regular Session

Title: Rationality in Practice Theory: Implications on Qing and Li Theory of Social Organization

Keywords: compathy, embodied-embedded cognitive science, practice theory and rationality

Joo-hyun CHO, Keimyung University, South Korea

Abstract: The social theory of rationality general enough to be equally applicable to both Asian and Western experiences is now possible through the efforts by many pragmatically oriented philosophers and social scientists during the last century and recent developments in cognitive science, neuroscience, AI, robotics, evolutionary psychology, and behavioral economics. This theory of rationality based on practice theory culminates more than a century-long attempts to escape from the conceptual constraints of representational epistemology in philosophy and the tradition of sociological research on rationality initiated by Weber and, later, Habermas.

I will first briefly present a preliminary theory of social practices as symbolic complex adaptive systems able to maintain both stability and adaptability relying sorely on each agent's ability of normative judgment on actions and judgmental criteria. Coupled with a theory of human agency based embodied-embedded cognitive science, this theory of social practices offers a most promising social theory of rationality not only consistent with the current scientific researches but also compatible with the long tradition of Western sociological and philosophical researches.

Then I will offer persuasive arguments for the claim that thus constructed theory of rationality is free from cultural biases possibly originating from its Western intellectual origin just as has been theories of modern natural sciences previously. This fact, in turn, implies that the social theory of rationality presented in this paper offers a common theoretical ground to analyze and compare roles of rationality and empathy in social practices including social organizations, institutions, and norms in Western and Asian societies. This will allow us a chance to view the issue of balance between emotion and reason as emphasized in Asian philosophical tradition from a new perspective. The remaining part of my paper will focus on the topic of the elements of rationality that can be discerned in Asian social traditions.

Regular Session

Title: Weberian Approach to the Theology of Yong-Gi Cho

Hong-Jung KIM, Seoul National University, South Korea

Abstract: In this article, I attempts at discussing some interesting themes underlying the theology of Pastor Cho Yong-gi. Having founded Yoido Full Gospel Church which is the biggest mega-church in the world as charismatic leader of Korean protestantism, he systematized a singular theology articulating the pentecostal religiosity and Korean tradition religiosity. It is usually called the theology of three-fold blessing and five-fold gospel. His spirituality is characterized by the accent put on this-worldly prosperity and success, on the quasi-material force of the Holy Spirit, and also on the positive mindset moulded by the religious practices. This kind of theological doctrines articulated with practices of worship and ministry typical to Full Gospel church rhymes perfectly with the developmental mentality of Korean modernity which reigned in the middle of the 20th century. It is in this sense that the meaning of Pastor Cho's theology overflows the boundaries of the christianity. It can be interpreted as the "spirit of Korean modernity", let alone Korean capitalism. Drawing on Max Weber's perspective of the capitalist spirit, I will explore the way how Cho's theological doctrines and practices constituted a specific Korean modern 'regime of the heart', and produced a singular type of subject, a strange conjunction of radical passivity towards the irresistible and of radical activity towards the secular world.

Regular Session

Title: Some Considerations on Max Weber's theory of 'Rationality'

CHON, Song U, Hanyang University, South Korea

Abstract: Max Weber will be regarded as one of the founders of Rationality-Theory in modern sociology. This reputation is, on the one hand, still valid, but should be, on the other hand, reconsidered and revised in many aspects. One main point of reconsiderations concerns the dichotomical struture of his rationality-theory which manifests itself preeminently in the typology of 'formal' and 'substantial' rationaly. Second point of reconsidering is the dichotomy of 'rational' and 'emotional'. On my opinion, this dichotomical approach has been surely a very convincing starting point of any theoretical reflections on the problem of rationality, but should now be questioned on the basis of the insights provided by cognitive sciences and natural sciences (especially evolutionary biology). One of the main objects of reconsidering Weber's rationality theory lies in the attempt to reconsile 'ratio' and 'emotio'.

Weber's Concept of
Richtigkeitsrationalitaet and Rationality of Compathy:
The Case of Filial Piety and Funeral Ritual Reform in China

HAN Sang-Jin
(Seoul National University, South Korea)

Introduction

Kaesler, a German scholar well known for his biographical study of Weber, delivered a lecture on Weber's theory of rationalization at the seminar room 208, Jing Yuen 2nd House, Peking University in the afternoon of March 23, 2018. The topic of his talk was "Universal Rationalization: Max Weber's great Narrative," and this was chaired by Li Qiang, a distinguished professor of political science, with the designated discussant, Tian Geng, a sociology professor of Peking University. The presentation was concise and sobering, making clear where he stands in the academic community of Weber, but there was nothing new. Starting from the familiar question, why it was only in the Western world that has produced a specific rational culture of universal significance (Kaesler, 2017, 319), he confirmed the thesis of universal rationalization by saying, 'No matter where Max Weber looked, everywhere he saw the irrefutable evidence of a great, world-historical process of rationalization" (320). This thesis has been long articulated. Schluchter, Tenbruch, Kalberg, and even Habermas have joined in it. What makes him interesting, however, is the argument that Weber examined the every and complex layers of human life comprising "the external organization of the world" (economy, law, technology, science, and state bureaucracy, etc.) and "the internal organization of the world" (religion, ethics, arts, culture and sexuality, etc.) and that Weber witnessed the systematic, inexorable, and universal rationalization throughout all of these spheres of human life. He also stressed what he called "an apocalyptic irony of unintended success," which means Weber was highly skeptical and pessimistic about human destiny. Kaesler metaphorically described the future as "the polar night of freezing darkness and hardship' rather than 'the blossoming of summer."

> The inseparable connection between this system of capitalist order of the economic life and the universally emerging machines of bureaucratic order in all spheres of life caused the endangerment of the individual freedom of all people, if not their ultimate destruction.(Kaesler, 2017, 322)

We can raise three questions from his more or less standard interpretation of Weber. First, is it accurate that Weber examined all the major layers of human life, though with different degrees of intensity and systematization, and confirmed the trend of universal rationalization? Weber supported value pluralism, evidenced by his studies of world religions. How can we make the thesis of universal rationalization compatible with Weber's pluralistic worldviews?

In particular, I want to discuss about emotion as a deepest layer of human life.

Second, is Weber's alleged pessimism of the future of rationalized world grounded theoretically well? Is it more contextually rooted or theoretically inevitable? The former may not be serious. We can understand well Weber's political experience and the historical context in which he thought. If the latter is the case, why is Weber's pessimism inevitable theoretically? Where does it come from, and is there any way out conceivable and feasible? In particular, I want to explore whether this is any possibility within Weber's writings to open up a way out from this pessimism.

Third, it is exactly here that we should come back to Weber's idea of value pluralism and its relation to rationality. There can be no dispute over the trend of value pluralism. But how it is related to rationality requires more careful attention than found in Weber and his followers. The key idea is that the concept of rationality in its strong version has a rational basis not simply in its predictability in terms of patterned, regularized, contextually shared and binding interaction among actors, but in the accomplishment of 'validity' anchored in value orientations which has something to do with its testing. Value pluralism and the validity of value orientation are not the same. Weber grasped the pluralities in value orientations with succinct clarity and also touched up the issues of validity, however in a limited scope except his theory of scientific and instrumental rationality. For this reason, I want to reexamine Weber's idea of understanding and interpretive sociology as a methodological framework of his theory of rationality and rationalization.

Value Pluralism, Rationality and Emotion

To translate value pluralism into Weber's concept of interpretive sociology, "the action of individuals can well be subjectively oriented toward several orders whose meaning, according to currently conventional modes of thought, "contradict" each other, yet nevertheless coexist" (Weber, 1981: 162). Life worlds are plural and diverse. Yet wherever we find ourselves, we interact to each other in certain ways intrinsically related to rationality. To make it simple, we orient our action to the expectations shared by stake holders so that interaction can be reasonably predicted and, possibly, explained. Weber deals with the rational basis of social order which lies in the patterned relationships. Interaction is rational in the sense that it follows certain rules and thus can be predicted. The emerging rational order is contrasted to being chaotic or unpredictable. Weber (1981:162) explained the rational basis of order by the notion of average probability. The members of a community,

> on the average, count on the probability of order-oriented behavior on the part of others, just as they also, on the average, regulate their own action according to the same kind of expectations held by others

Here comes the idea of empirical validity of an order. Weber suggests that the rule-following and order-oriented action is for sociology "the most rational meaning most directly comprehensible." But he adds that the mutual orientation towards others' expectations is too

limiting and unstable from the point of view of rationality.

> The stability of these expectations is increased the more one can, on the average, not only count on the participants' orienting their own action toward the expected action of others, but also, the more widespread among them is the view that the subjectively comprehended "legality" (or 'validity' more generally-Han) of the order is "binding" on them.

In this way, Weber combined in his theory of rationality both the objective orientation towards shared expectation (order) and the subjective orientation towards the validity of the order. Seen in this perspective, the rationality of an order depends on the subjective belief in the validity of the shared expectations, as empirically observed rather than assessed normatively or reflexively.

We can take this perspective and investigate various spheres of life world and differentiated systems by asking how interactions are patterned in each system along the ways suggested above. Weber himself attempted this in his 1913 article on some categories of interpretive society by focusing on the rational basis of social order built into interest organizations like association, economic organization, and state authority. At the same time, in many other writings, Weber followed the idea of the pluralization of value orientation and the specialization of social systems and investigated which value orientation has become firmly institutionalized in which system, sorting out salient characteristics of the patterns of rationality anchored in these value orientation and systems.

Consequently, Weber has been said to provide various types and levels of rationality, such as purposive-instrumental rationality, value rationality, scientific rationality, formal rationality, bureaucratic rationality, legal rationality, substantive rationality, rationalities of world religion, arts, professional activities, etc. Strictly speaking, we can speak of rationality of magic and sorcery when these practices were taken for granted and served as guidelines of human interaction. Historically speaking, rationalization means disenchantment which breaks down the validity of the institutionalized order of interaction built into the world of magic and sorcery. However, the logic or rationality is same at this primitive level of description Weber offers in the 1913 article. The objective orientation toward shared expectation among the members of the community and the subjective orientation towards the validity of an order emerging from this are not different in kind between the systems of science and magic. The difference is that in the systems of science and professionally differentiated systems rationality accompanies the process of becoming ever more methodologically consistent, systematic and specific in application and regulation.

Weber was able to keep the thesis of universal rationalization and value pluralism for the reason that, as a society becomes more and more modern, in every spheres of life world and systems where specific value orientation is operating, rationalization in terms of methodological consistency, systematization, and specificity can be universally observed. In this sense, Weber is consistent. Rationalization in this particular sense can be seen not only in science and technology but also in religion and arts.

However, I would argue that the thesis of value plurality is cut short by Weber's methodology of interpretive sociology. He saw social change in terms of internal differentiation

and specialization of value orientation and understood rationalization from the perspective of actor and institution involved. Thus, we can speak of rationality and rationalization of religions and arts since they refer to the specific institutions like church and actors like artists. They are not the same as science and technology. They develop their own concepts, standards, and rules of rationality distinguished from other systems. But they all can be said to be in the process of rationalization as briefly sketched above. However, the problem emerges in the cases of value orientation which is so basic that it cannot be identified as professionally expressed in any particular institution like arts though it works at the bottom of human life. Here, the pertinent issue is emotion, particularly the kind of heart regime deeply rooted in history providing the common basis of sympathy. Emotion has been long treated to be unpredictable and thus irrational. Emotion has been recognized as offering the energy to, and context of, rational action. Seldom, however, it has been brought into theory of rationality itself.

Emotion as a New Basis of Politics and SNS

As Weber did from perspective of interpretive sociology, Streeck and Schmitter (1985: 119) raise the question of rational basis of social order from the perspective of political science. The basic order is defined by the relations of three central institutions: the market, the state bureaucracy and community. They then identified their respective and distinctive guiding principles. The market is governed by the principle of freedom, like such interest as profit seeking, free trade and competition. So, liberal economy forms a backbone of social order. The political institution is governed by the principle of popular sovereignty in terms of free election and fair administration. What has come out from the relation of the market and the political institution in the Western modernity is characterized by a balance of countervailing powers between the market representing freedom and the political institutions representing equality. Thus, social order accompanies the mechanisms of interest articulation and negotiation (bargaining) among the main economic and political actors and institutions. Today, however, political representation through the political party parliament functions no more effectively as in the past. Instead, community began to preoccupy attention. Neither rational calculation of interests nor deliberation of value works as a major orientation in politics, but affection, emotion, and feeling work and spread fast. In the global risk society in which individuals face ever more potential dangers, isolation, and anxiety, they look for a community which would offer fraternity, help, protection, and affection as "a sense of belonging to and participating in the group as such" (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985:121). Community is important for them to "satisfy their mutual needs for a shared affective existence and a distinctive collective identity" (p.212). In this context, emotion emerges as a primary driving force of politics. This tendency is inexorable and irreversible as it is intrinsically linked to, and supported by, the new technology of digital communication like social network services.

I wonder, therefore, whether it is not the time to pay special attention to emotion from the perspective of rationality. Though 'suppressed' in the mainstream Western discourses of reason and rationality, emotion began to be expressed as a legitimate force of politics. Yet it is still controversial how to treat emotion. All agree that emotion deeply penetrates into politics.

Without emotion, politics is just like a machine as Weber saw. But no one has clarified clearly whether emotion, as a primordial value orientation, involves rational characteristics it itself, and, if so, how we can define and assess its rationality.

Giddens explained how digital revolution had reshaped the political terrain anew in an interview that I had with Giddens at the Lord House in London in early December 2017. The followings are a few excerpts.

"If you look at digital world you got amazing opportunities for transformation of a positive kind. On the other hand, you have risks that we have never faced before. And the opportunities and the risks are a bit different from any other historical era in some ways. People always ask you when you give a speech if you are an optimist. I don't feel you can say you are if you want, but I like to say I don't know the world in lots of ways, because some of these forces are so new. So, you can be an optimist if you want. The main thing is to analyze out the balance of risks and opportunities and it's very large on both sides, I think. The opportunities are huge because let's say, some people really think you could produce immortality. It's not impossible anymore, whether it's desirable or not. On the other hand, the risks are equally huge."

"You have always got to have a certain emotional substratum to politics. Politics can't just be empty debate. You have got to have some motivational force to it. Another way of putting it is that you got to have values. And the values Donald Trump stands for are not mine, mostly anyway. But what I am saying is to me, the big force behind a lot of these things is the onrush of the digital age, which interacts with more well-established risks

"I would tend to insist on the importance of living in a digital age, because when we got one of these in your pocket, you got all kinds of the world's knowledge in your pocket. You can chuck anything you want. Nothing is outside. That's the different world. You know you can find anything about political leaders. You got of sorts of assertions made on social media across the world, many of which may be fake news and so forth. So, we have to deal with a cluster of issues, to reconstruct democracy, one of which is the control of the digital world because we've lost control of it, as individual citizens and as nation-states. That's one of the reasons for the troubles, but to some extent the digital world is also the answer I think. The pace of change is so huge. But you can't allow the world, or we shouldn't allow the world, where people just set up fake websites and others are influenced by those websites, where one state can simply introduce, kind of, covert cyberwar against the other state. That's a pretty dangerous world from which democratic systems have to rescue themselves."

Living in the world different in kind from the past, we are required to stretch the concept of rationality into the domain of emotion. It is no longer healthy to treat emotion as such as unpredictable or irrational. On the contrary, emotion occupies the deep space of common feeling and the regime of heart as a historical product yields powerful influence over human interaction. Weber recognized this in his 1913 article but didn't pay due attention to emotion later when he developed ideal-typical concepts of rationality on the basis of the internal

differentiation and institutionalization of value orientations. On the contrary, the whole traditions of Confucianism have been predicated upon the fundamental importance of emotion in human behavior and political governance.

Purposive-Instrumental Rationality and the Pessimistic Future Outlook

There is nothing to add to the thesis of universal rationalization which, in fact, means the increasing world governance of the specific type of rationality Weber called purposive-instrumental rationality. This rationality is embodied in such major institutions of modernity as science, technology, laws, bureaucracy, capitalist enterprises, etc. But why Weber remained pessimistic about the future of rationalized world requires some reflections. Here we must distinguish two levels (not types) of rationality. One is the rationality with "empirical" validity of value orientation as observed in the life world; another is the rationality with "scientific" validity of value orientation which can be tested. I have argued above that insofar as we are concerned about the first, there is no difference in rationality between science and magic. In both systems, individuals orient themselves to the shared expectation objectively and accept subjectively the empirical validity of the emerging order out of this context. However, in the latter case, the instrumental rationality embodied in science, technology, bureaucracy and market institutions differs from other types of rationality by the fact that it can prove its validity in terms of testing either a scientific proposition or efficiency. What matters here is not simply the subjective orientation and acceptance of empirical validity of value orientation but the objective evidence of truth or efficiency as validity realized by science, bureaucracy, and the capitalist enterprises. For this reason, purpose-instrumental rationality can make progress by putting the concerned validity of value orientation into the process of testing. Along this progress, rationality becomes more capable of controlling and regulating the world. One of the inevitable consequences of this is the increasing world domination by purposive-instrumental rationality.

Weber was correct when he sorted out this specific type of rationality out of many others and anticipated the world to be increasingly penetrated and dominated by this rationality, not simply as a historical force, but as supported by accumulating scientific knowledge, technology, efficiency in management, the effect of bureaucratic control, etc. Whether this anticipation should lead one to a pessimistic view of the future, perhaps, depends on the assessment of the historical context in which one is situated. More important than this is a theoretical reason for this pessimistic outlook. Though Weber upheld a pluralistic world view with multiple value orientations, he didn't clearly distinguish the concept of value orientation and that of validity embodied in it. Furthermore, he was unable to see other modes of testing validities except scientific testing. He sharply distinguished facts and values and argued that value judgment cannot be rationally justified as we do in science. Fundamentally, value orientation, as a condition of all knowledge, is something that I either find already inscribed in my way of looking at the world or have to choose as a matter of decision. In either case, however, value decision cannot be rationally discussed as in science. Consequently, the thesis of universal rationalization cannot but anchored in the one-dimensional constant expansion of purposive-instrumental rationality despite his advocacy of value pluralism. This is why Weber was unable

to get out of the pessimistic future outlook.

Revisit to Weber and Habermas' Focus on Validity Claims

I propose that we go back to Weber's 1913 article on interpretive sociology to explore whether there is any way out from what Kaesler called an apocalyptic skepticism or pessimism of Weber. In this respect, I want to focus on Habermas' conceptual strategy of separating validity claims from value orientation and explore how his argument based on this strategy can help us reread Weber's concept of Richtigkeitsrationalitaet anew.

Weber's concept of Richtigkeitsrationalitaet is so ambiguous and complex that it is extremely difficult to translate into English. He used this concept in his methodological writing of interpretive society but completely left out when he later tried to develop the logically clear-cut concepts of rationality on the basis of differentiation and institutionalization of value orientations. A standard translation of this concept is 'objectively correct rationality.' Similarly, Richtigkeitsrational action is translated into 'action correctly oriented toward objectively valid goal.' This concept is inspiring since it refers to a broad range of complex possibilities before differentiation of the concepts of rationality. In fact, Weber used this ambiguous concept as a reference to a primordial and undifferentiated comprehensive rationality which he set in the background of his theory of rationalities. Nevertheless, the simple question we face is what the expression 'correct' (richtig) means.

When we take certain action of others to be correct, it can have multiple connotations. Mostly commonly, it is correct in the sense that it unfolds as I expect or predict. It is correct in the sense that it takes shared expectation to be valid and binding for orientation. To be more specific, an action can be said correct when it rationally adopts the most efficient means to realize the goal. Correct may mean that the action follows normative rules of interaction that I support. It could also mean that the action immerses into the emotional spheres of feeling and sympathy working in my heart. Objectively correct rationality embraces all these aspects of rationality of value orientation before being analytically separated. If we introduce analytical and logical differentiation into this concept, it can then be said that the criteria of being correct are not simply cognitive and moral, but also expressive and emotive.

Weber recognized the complexities involved in conceptualizing rationalities of action. He took the objectively correct type of action and the purposive-instrumental type of action in the opposite pole of classification and attempt to delineate different types of action in-between these two poles.

> For sociology, the following are related on a gliding scale: (1) the objectively correct type, approximately attained; (2) the (subjective) instrumentally rational type; (3) behavior only more or less conscious or perceived and more or less unambiguously instrumentally rational; (4) behavior that is not instrumentally rational but is in a meaningfully understandable context; (5) behavior that is motivated in a more or less meaningfully understandable context, a context more or less strongly interrupted or codetermined by unintelligible elements; and finally, (6) the wholly unintelligible

psychic or physical phenomena "in" and "about" a person. Sociology knows that not every course of action progressing in an objectively "correctly rational" manner was conditioned by subjectively rational purpose; in particular, it is self-evident to sociology that the actual action is not determined by the logically and rationally inferable but rather by the psychological relationships (p.156)

This statement can be interpreted in the following way. First, Weber treated the objectively correct type of action as the undifferentiated background reference to complex rationality and the purposive-instrumental type of action as the analytically most clear-cut and systematic rationality. Second, Weber assumed in this context historical change in terms of increasing differentiation of rationalities starting from this undifferentiated background concept. Third, in-between these two opposite poles Weber saw different types and levels of rational action including the role of norm and emotion. In particular, the psychological relationships refer to emotional streams embodied in rationality. Thus, it remains a pressing task how to develop the possibility of the rationality of deeply rooted common feeling from Weber's undifferentiated comprehensive concept of objectively correct rationality. This task is important because the common feeling historically shaped provides the basis for objectively correct rationality.

Before we move to the rationality of compathy from this perspective, we need to consider briefly Habermas' contribution to the theory of rationality. Habermas attempts to systematize Weber's idea of value pluralism.

The cultural rationalisation from which the structures of consciousness typical of modern societies emerge embraces cognitive, aesthetic expressive and moral-evaluative elements of the religious tradition. With science and technology, with autonomous art and the values of expres sive self-presentation, with universal legal and moral representations, there emerges a differentiation of *three value spheres, each of which follow its own logic*. […] As soon as science, morality and art have been differentiated into autonomous spheres of values, each under *one* universal validity claim—truth, normative rightness, authenticity or beauty—objective advances, improvements, enhancements become possible in a sense specific to each (Habermas 1984: 164-65, 176-77).

<Figure 1> Weber and Habermas on rationality and rationalization

Habermas' genuine contribution lies in conceptually separating validity claims from value orientations (Harrington, 2000) and views learning via testing these validity claims as the key to social evolution. This links a new horizon to Weber in the sense that it now becomes possible to speak of the rationality of normative judgment which was impossible for Weber. It also makes it possible to go beyond the one-dimensional expansion of purposive-instrumental rationality attached to Weber's thesis of universal rationalization. We can also see the increase of discursively mediated practical rationality in the form of deliberative democracy and identify its rational basis in collective learning through testing normative validity claims. So, it is now possible theoretically to get out of Weber's trap of pessimistic outlook of the future.

However, it still remains unclear how to conceptualize the rationality of common feeling and sympathy. Emotion has become a distinctive value orientation today. It is not necessarily irrational. Compathy can serve as a rational basis of politics. The rationality of common feeling is certainly possible as is the rationality of common sense. It is also essential to define clearly the specific validity claims anchored in the rationality of compathy and seek the possible way in which this claim can be tested and institutionalized.

Furthermore, we should move further to ask questions in line with Habermas. His contribution to a discursive testing of the validity claim of the normative value orientation is significant. Thus, we can think of rationalization of life world not only from the cognitive but also moral perspectives. Yet we should ask seriously how the scientific rationality can be fruitfully related to the normative rationality which Habermas has defended. Each has its specific logic and developmental pathway. But how are they interrelated with respect to the concrete problem we face like global risks? In this regard, as an example, the address by Obama, former President of the United States, at Hiroshima, Japan on May 26, 2016 is revealing.

> Science allows us to communicate across the seas and fly above the clouds, to cure disease and understand the cosmos, but those same discoveries can be turned into ever more efficient killing machines. The wars of the modern age teach us this truth. Hiroshima teaches this truth. Technological progress without an equivalent progress in human institutions can doom us. The scientific revolution that led to the splitting of an atom requires a moral revolution as well.
> That is why we come to this place. We stand here in the middle of this city and force ourselves to imagine the moment the bomb fell. We force ourselves to feel the dread of children confused by what they see. We listen to a silent cry. We remember all the innocents killed across the arc of that terrible war and the wars that came before and the wars that would follow. Mere words cannot give voice to such suffering. But we have a shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again (Obama, 2016).

The experience of Hiroshima sensitizes our attention to the need for a balanced theory of rationality. What is needed is not just a model of parallel development of scientific (purposive-instrumental) and moral (normative) rationality but an overlapping structure in which truth and norms can support each other constructively in practical applications. This means that the rationality of common sense, common feeling, common norms, which progresses in history,

can serve as a critical yardstick for testing the relevance of scientific and technological application which affects the security and safety of citizens' life.

In the remaining section, I want to examine a concrete reform movement in China to learn lessons for keeping balance between reason and emotion from a post-Confucian perspective

However, it still remains unclear how to conceptualize the rationality of common emotion as a distinctive value orientation today. It is far more unclear and mucky how to institutionalize this rationality in the society. To solve this problem, it is essential to define clearly the specific validity claims associated with the rationality of compathy and seek the possible way in which this validity claim can be tested. There is a long way to go, indeed. For the sake of convenience, we stop here about conceptual inquiry and examine instead a concrete case of reform movement in China to learn lessons for keeping balance between reason and emotion in the historical transformation

(The next part please refer to the prepared ppt material)

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Rationality and Practice Theory:
Implications on Multiple Modernities

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I. Introduction

The character of modernity in civilizations other than the Western has been the focus of sustained and concentrated research efforts in humanities and social sciences. It is obvious that the concepts of modernity and related ones including public sphere, rationality, justice, and human rights are first formulated and further analyzed in detail in the Western world. The deployment of these conceptual tools to characterize the kind of social revolutions occurred in Europe since the sixteenth century has been the main strategy adopted by researchers. Furthermore, these efforts have been main sources for the public, at least those in the West, to rely on for understanding how the modern world has come into being in the present form. Furthermore this understanding has provided most important guidelines for both policy makers and people in the West to keep their social systems both stable and efficient.

There is no denying that what impressed peoples in other civilizations most was the economic prosperity and technological developments achieved by the West since the Enlightenment. Now with recent economic ascendance of both China and India culminating the process of capitalist market-based restructuring of economic systems in the global world that went on during the last half century, the idea of multiple modernities that has to be argued for until less than two decades ago seems no longer controversial.[1] The old thesis that "the cultural program of modernity as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world" (Eisenstadt 2000, 1) at least deserves a close scrutiny. This change of trend is reflected in an increasing number of recent works on these issues both in the East and West. In this sense, the time is ripe for reevaluation of the intuitions gained from more than centuries-old East Asian scholarly works on the origins, natures, and implications of modernity and their relation to Confucianism

Attempts to align the Confucian ethics along the direction of modern democracy were made by many East Asian scholars sympathetic to the New Confucianism. Among these theoretical works are those on the possibility of Confucian modernity and the nature of the public in relation to the concept of public sphere. In this work, I will focus on the research works on the Confucian understanding of modernity and public sphere that have been going on in Korea during the last decade. I will show that when examined from the perspective of the

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[1] See, for example, the contributions by Eisenstadt (2000), Kaviraj (2000), and Tu Weiming (2000) in *Daedalus* 129(10) Multiple Modernities (Winter, 2000).

theory of social practices as symbolic complex adaptive systems (to be abbreviated as "practice theory" hereafter), these issues can be more systematically analyzed and relevant points will be better illuminated. In the remainder of section I, I will begin my paper by presenting a brief sketch of my arguments based on practice theory before discussing it in a more detailed manner to help readers form a general picture of this rather complicated theory.

Practice theory explains the operation of society in terms of social practices. Social practices range from formal institutions such as governments, judicial systems, legislatures, companies, and NGOs to informal ones such as social norms, languages, laws, moral norms, market systems, aesthetic practices, and scientific practices. Similar concepts have been proposed under diverse names by many authors previously. I define a social practice as a symbolic social structure consisting of relevant performances and normative judgments on them by participating agents. Each qualified agent practicing a given social practice has personal knowledge of its ever changing roles and purposes and can usually make normative judgments of performances by her and by other agents in an expert manner. I will call such abilities as coping skills. She acquires her coping skills through social learning processes from her early years continuing through her whole social life. These skills of understanding and judgment characterize her as a sapient being, hence are essential abilities for her to function as a rational social being. Here normative judgment means judging a given performance to be right or wrong, appropriate or inappropriate, proper or improper, or good or bad according to the criteria of judgment she formulated based on her knowledges of roles or purposes of the social practice. Hence normativity in our context does not have moral implications in general. These normative judgments provide important ques for other members to adaptively adjust their behaviors which is done instinctively in most cases.

At each moment of normative judgment by an agent, she could refuse to apply the established criteria of judgments and attempt innovative judgment. This could occur when she finds the present criteria inefficient, not creative, or simply boring. This is an important moment of revealing her agency and initiating adaptive transformation of the social practice. Another such a moment is when an agent does not respond to normative judgments by other members in an expected manner. This could be a moment of resistance, defiance, or encouragement for an attempt of creative judgment by other agents. Obviously these are very complicated abilities and the theory of social practices claims that they constitute the essence of human rationality, agency, and freedom. Clearly the stability and efficiency of each social practice depend exclusively on these coping skills of agents. Since my theory claims that the only essential components of the culture in a society are social practices, this means that the stability and efficiency of the society critically depend on these skills of its agents.

I propose that the normative dynamics of social practices briefly described in the above is what constitutes the bare minimum (and sufficient) structure required for any type of meaningful social structure to maintain its stability and its efficiency. Without such stability and efficiency necessary to maintain its identity and perform its role, it will be just a transient phenomenon, such as a fad, worthy of little sociological interest.[2] Note that here I am

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[2] This does not mean that there are objective criteria for distinguishing these transient phenomena from social practices. Any social practices start from such phenomena and there will be critical moments that separate their long term destinies.

proposing a useful criterion of distinguishing interesting social phenomena from those not and obviously this kind of proposal cannot be proved or falsified. Rather, supports for my theory will only come by proving itself useful or providing useful examples of applications.

I claim that the concept of public sphere that Habermas has been striving to base his theory of modernity on is a typical example of a social practice in operation.[3] The existence of public sphere is claimed to be an essential condition of the Western modernity by many political philosophers in favor of deliberative politics. We will see this claim has important implications on the issues of multiple modernities. The previous theories of modernity, public sphere, and democracy contain many characteristics derived from specifically Western experiences despite intense efforts by political philosophers to formalize their theories in the form independent of their local and historical contexts. Contrasting them with economic theories of capitalist market system will make my points clearer. Economic theories of capitalist market system are presented in such a sufficiently formalized form as to be applicable without being restricted by its European origin. This is a main reason that there are little fundamental disagreements on the choice of economic theories for policy makers to make their economic decisions based on across the world. Of course, there are differences among actual forms of economic decisions and choices that may depend on cultural and historical traditions in these countries.[4] This implies that either social theories underlying the present theories of modernities are not sufficiently scientific, at least compared to economic theories, or the social theories that are imported to explain, for example, East Asian experiences are not suitable for such a purpose at least in the present form. I am claiming that practice theory is the right theoretical framework that should replace them for our search for the concept of modernity suitable to East Asian contexts to be successful. In this work, I will explain why in details.

This paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of the previous research works in section 2, I will present my practice theory as a general theoretical framework allowing us to compare and analyze diverse concepts relevant to the discussion of modernity and related concepts in section 3. Then I will present what new insights my practice theory can illuminate on these issues in section 4. I will conclude by briefly examining what modifications practice theory suggests to improve efficacy of the present theories of Confucian modernity in section 5.

II. Review of the Previous Works on Confucian Modernity and Public Sphere

Confucian scholars in the Joseon dynasty adopted the Neo-Confucianism systemized by Zhu Xi of the Song dynasty in China and perfected into a form of Korean Neo-Confucianism. In their hands, Neo-Confucianism developed into a full set of social practices pervading and governing every aspect of Korean lives by the sixteenth century including highly sophisticated

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[3] Habermas (1998) has given a very concrete and detailed explanation of the public sphere. This is not a coincidence since the law, especially common law as practiced in Anglo-American judicial systems, has been the paradigmatic example of social practice in action (Brandom 2013). Indeed we can easily discern many characteristics of practice theory in the philosophies of law by Hart (1997) and Dworkin (1986) for example. For an example of interpretation of legal practices from the perspective of practice theory, see (Cho Joohyun 2016).

[4] Astute readers will notice that this issue is closely related to the MethodenStreit and controversies on the nature of social sciences. I will deal this issue too in this paper.

political systems and ethical codes at least for those in the Yangban class. These social practices were almost unprecedented in human civilizations in that they were actually put into work in such a sophisticated manner tightly controlling even everyday belief and manner of Yangban in a way reminiscent of Foucault's disciplinary power and technology of the self at work (Cho Joo-hyun 1999).

In an important work on the Confucian modernity, Kim Sangjun (2011) carefully analyzed the working of a political system peculiar to the Joseon dynasty, *Gongron*. According to him, the Joseon dynasty perfected their political system based on *Gongron* and could grow into a nation-state through the kind of Moralpolitik performed by scholar-bureaucrats or literati (*Sadaebu*) employing their expert knowledge of the Neo-Confucianism that had been elaborated into an exquisite system of codes of manners in the seventeenth century. Kim Sangjun (2011) claims that the working of *Gongron* that allowed such a transformation possible and originated from the one in the Song dynasty in China can be considered as a Korean counterpart of the public sphere that Habermas identified in the seventeenth century Europe in that public authority monopolized by the court is shared by the public group able to form public opinion affecting the national policies. I will claim in section 4 that both *Gongron* and the public sphere are examples of a social practice and their common characteristics and relations between two can be better explained from the perspective of practice theory. This will help us discuss two systems in a more balanced manner allowing us to take into account their differing socio-cultural backgrounds, thus paying better attention to the original spirit of multiple modernities.

With the miraculous economic developments of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in 1970s and 1980s, many scholars proposed theories claiming strong positive roles of Confucianism in their economic developments just as they attributed a similarly spectacular economic success of Japan in the previous decade to her heritage of the feudal system (Tu, Weiming 1996). However, according to an important analysis by Paul Krugman, the economic developments in both cases are mainly due to the sacrifice by well-educated workers willing to work hard for long hours despite low wages rather than their economic efficiency (Krugman, 1994). If Krugman's analysis is correct, the role of Confucianism in their economic developments may have been in helping them persevere the hardship such sacrifice required instead of providing social capital necessary for rational social systems and practices that are pointed out to be the most important factor of similar economic developments centuries before in the West. This may also explain its role in causing the kind of structural distortion and inefficiency of economic systems that are pointed out to be main reasons for the delay of long overdue entrance of these countries into the league of developed countries.

In the case of Korea, there are two diverging claims on the roles of Confucianism on the current sociocultural terrain (Na Jongseok 2015). Kim Deok-yeong (2014) and Chang Eun-Joo (2014) deploy the Confucianism to explain the kind of transformation the Korean tradition effected on the mainly Western modernization process through its influences on the everyday lives of ordinary people. Both of them explain diverse social problems to have originated from this kind of typical processes going on in forming multiple modernities in nations with various cultural traditions. Kim Sangjun (2011) and Miyajima Hirosi (2013), in contrast, emphasize some important influences the Confucianism is claimed to have exercised in the political

democratization processes and in forming certain positive characteristics of Korean society such as creativity and peacefulness. In section 4, I will discuss the claims of both groups and examine whether our practice theory can locate them in a more illuminating analytical frame.

III. Practice Theory and Agonistic Politics

According to Stephen Turner, practices are "the vanishing point of twentieth-century philosophy." He goes on to point out that "The major philosophical achievements of the century are now widely interpreted as assertions about practices, even though they were not originally couched in this language" (Turner 1994, 1). Anyone trying to capture this concept in a succinct set of words will find herself in the situation described in an Indian story of the blind men and an elephant. Practices[5] were variously called habitus, norms, institutions, tradition, life forms, forms of life, world views, paradigm, ideology, tacit knowledge, framework, coping skills, knowing how, and presuppositions to cite a few well known ones. Each of these concepts is invented to emphasize some characteristics of a social practice deemed to be crucial to the concept. The bewildering number of authors on practice theory in almost every academic disciplines shows the futility of attempting to construct a theory of practices covering all the characteristics that these authors thought important. Then, the right approach seems to be searching for the basic structure common to all practices that these authors believed essential in their theoretical frameworks that are felt to be missing in other concepts. I will claim that the structure thus identified is sufficient to characterize a social practice.

An elusive concept such as a social practice can be better focused on by contrasting it with what it is not. In my previous work,[6] I sketched three sources or components that consist the kind of practice theory that I am aiming for. The three main components consisting my version of practice theory, called the theory of social practices as symbolic complex adaptive systems, are identified as social practice theory, philosophical pragmatism influenced by the tradition of German idealism and phenomenology and further modified by the recent developments in cognitive sciences and evolutionary psychology, and finally by theories of complex adaptive systems.[7]

In this work, I will start by giving a temporary definition of practice theory. Practice theory explains diverse social norms and institutions essential for operation of a society as crucially involving social practices consisting of a set of stable and evolving pattern of behavior maintained by intersubjective normative judgments performed by its actors on their acts. The only requirement on this system of interlocking normative judgments is that it should satisfy the rules of what Sellars called the "game of giving and asking for reasons." This requirement is the bare bone structure that keeps normative judgments rational, hence the social practice maintained by them efficient. This minimum requirement is also maximal in the sense that any

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[5] Sometimes I will call them social practices to emphasize its social character.

[6] For references, see Cho Joo-hyun (2017a) and references therein.

[7] Of course, three components do not form a clear cut classification and many theories and authors, especially those belonging to social practice theory and philosophical pragmatism, could be arguably classified into either one. As is well known, this group of authors and theories frequently influenced or owe intellectual debts to each other.

additional requirements or structures we may attempt to impose on this system will necessarily restrict the space of possibilities that the resulting social practice can explore, and eventually limit its efficiency and creativity. The job of explicating what these rules explicitly mean was the main aim of the work by Robert Brandom (1994).

In the following, I will give only a brief summary of Brandom's theory of discursive practices that will form the core part of my practice theory and refer to my previous work for detailed discussion of three main components and how they are combined in a single framework (Cho, Joo-hyun 2017a). A specific model I am focusing on is Brandom's deontic scorekeeping model (Brandom 1994). Here a member of a social practice recognized as its practitioner by other members takes responsibility to follow the norm. And other members' authority thus to impose responsibility upon her through their recognitions is effective only through her recognition. The normative dependence of reciprocal responsibility and authority among members can attain the normative status beyond subjectivity, thus is sufficient to constitute social practices.

<Figure 1> A model for social practices according to Brandom

Thus recognized and acknowledged, each member keeps scores for all members including herself. The scores consist of commitments and entitlements acknowledged by a member and attributed by a scorekeeper. Here each member constructs score functions by scoring and recording her and other members' commitments and entitlements and collecting them. Score functions determine both the process that determines the meaning of each performance through their scores at each moment and the process that changes judgmental criteria ascribing appropriate commitments and entitlements to each member. This completes the feedback

process that turns each member's performance as an object of judgment and also affects the judgmental norms serving as criteria for judgment of each performance.

Implications of Brandom's model for social practices are as follows. An "inefficient" social practice in a society is an accumulated result of judgments on social norms as judgmental criteria by each member at the moment of normative judgment. The point of resistance against an "inefficient" social practice in a society leading to its transformation, annihilation, or creation of a whole new social practice resides at the moment of judgment by each member. Each member should realize that the moment of rational reconstruction of social practice through each judgment is exactly the moment of determining what kind of "better" society she wants to belong to.

From its beginning at the origin of classical pragmatism that forms a core part of the practice theory I am advocating in this work, practice theory started as a coherent framework comprising both the theoretical critique of epistemology and principled methods for dealing with moral and political practices. [8] Therefore practice theory provides a systematic perspective on political practices. In the remainder of this section, I will discuss the political implications of social practices as a means of achieving efficiency of a society and claim that agonistic politics advocated previously by various political theorists is the only political implementation of practice theory faithful to its insights. Politics in the most general sense concerns transformation of social practices including formal institutions to achieve an efficient society. Here efficiency is not restricted to the narrow concept adopted in economics. There are no permanent criteria for efficiency. The only bound to the variety of efficiency possible in a society is the imagination of its "mature" citizens that can change continuously at every moment of its normative judgment on rules or criteria applied to its social practices.

I will start from two concepts of freedom: negative freedom from varied social and natural constraints and positive freedom to do something. The latter is "obtainable only by constraining oneself by the conceptual norms implicit in discursive social practices." The first perspective is based on instrumental rationality and regards the legitimacy of each individual's desire as beyond rational analysis or out of intelligent discussion, thus insisting on concentrating the issues of choosing the most efficient way to satisfy desire. On the other hand, in the second perspective, each individual is regarded as the subject of discursive practices and each individual's performances and accompanying responsibility, commitment, entitlement, and acknowledgement collectively determine meanings of rational acts. And it accepts "the capacity to bind oneself by conceptual norms, to undertake responsibility, to make commitments, to exercise and acknowledge authority as the core of the freedom" (Brandom 2009, 143). Brandom claims that Hegel transformed this Kantian concept of positive freedom into "expressive positive freedom," adding the following three aspects: normative status as essentially social status, the importance of discursive practices as the paradigmatic exercise of Kantian positive freedom, and the possibility of "self-conscious self-constituting self-transformation," that is, making themselves be different by taking themselves to be different. Following Kant and Hegel, Brandom emphasized "expressive positive freedom," the enabling aspect of positive freedom made possible by social practices and the possibility of "self-

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[8] And for aesthetic practices, too. For an application of practice theory on aesthetics, see Cho Joo-hyun (2017b).

conscious self-constituting self-transformation." (Brandom 2009, 144-46).

An important point to note is that it is possible to transform social practices through expressive positive freedom allowed to us by discursive practices. Though social practices are sources for positive freedom, they can also serve to sustain "wrong" or "inefficient" practices. Both the possibility of problematic social practice and the creativity of positive freedom through social practice are ineluctable twin aspects of the same origin: the absence of objective criteria or God's point of view. The absence of a freestanding foundation means that each new performance in social practice could be either a predicative moment of politics (Zerilli 2005) or a retrogressive moment of deterioration, with no comprehensive doctrines that can guarantee the better world. Foucault's all too famous remarks are perspicacious comments on this point:

> My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism. I think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger (Foucault 1983, 231-32).

The fact that there are no comprehensive and algorithmic doctrines that allow "to determine which is the main danger," thus guaranteeing a better world, implies that neoliberal governmentality with its capillary manners of power operation and expressive positive freedom share social practices as their networks of channels and conduits for operation, making the former all the more difficult to resist. For instance, as Butler (1997) has stated, psychic attachments that contribute to the perpetuation of relations of domination and subordination for women originate from a desire for recognition. But this desire for recognition emerges from the social interactions women are engaging in, which in turn are determined by social practices forming basic frameworks to interpret and assign meaning to individual lives. Thus social practices serve as resources, for example, for the self-empowerment of female subjectivity as well as causes for continuing its subordination. An important point is that social practices enable expressive positive freedom through discursive practices, offering valuable tools for transforming social practices that originally made such freedom possible. Although this approach may not seem to be much, and may exasperate representationalists and those in support of identity politics, this framework actually offers both the most efficient and creative tools, and is moreover the only one available to us, as practice theorists have reminded us.

If Foucault's practice theory articulated the constituted character of subjectivity through his concept of power, Brandom's theory tried to reveal the twin aspects of the constitution and agency of the subject residing in each performance through the concept of positive freedom. Viewed from the perspective of positive freedom, social practices working through operations of power reveal their positive role of enabling women to live as social beings and to serve as sources for creative self-constitution and self-transformation. This implies ample possibilities to overcompensate the loss of negative freedom from complying with institutions and norms by increasing positive one (Brandom 2009, 52-77). Of course, the similarity of these concepts to those of the market economy is not accidental, and both cases will be seen as manifestations of one common basic phenomenon when a general theory of social practices is completed.

Facing no comprehensive prescriptions for political decisions, what will be the most "efficient" procedure for decision? We already know Zerilli's proposal (or for that matter Arendt's proposal) for political action to initiate transformations of "anomalous" social practices or to overthrow domination. We can generalize and formalize her strategy to deal with the problem of political decision procedures. Agonistic politics willing to lay down everything on the table, including the rules of the game and decision procedures, and to question them will arguably be the best bet. In liquid modernity, where each individual cannot be sure of what she desires, only agonism as a sublimation of antagonism can hope to satisfy each desire efficiently by opening up creative space in politics. Raising issues, arguing for her claims, endeavoring for clarification, and raising objections in confrontation with no consensus or conclusion enforced will provide eventually "optimal" political results if successful. Practice theory, which forms the theoretical foundation for agonistic politics, suggests there are no predetermined criteria allowing people to classify each performance as an instance of subjection or self-transformation. This fact reveals the necessity of a more detailed theory of action and decision process comprising practice theory (Brandom 2009, 144-46; quoted from Cho, Joo-hyun 2013, 92).

Perhaps a comparison of agonistic politics and deliberative politics will bring the issue into relief. Though deliberative politics shares many characteristics with agonistic politics, such as an emphasis on political deliberations, it refuses to give up the idea of public reason as a final arbitrator to resort to. It agrees implicitly or explicitly that the political issues on the table for deliberation should be restricted to "reasonable" claims and procedures, and that methods of deliberation should be based on some forms of criteria agreed upon by "reasonable" members of communities. Agonistic politics rejects these hopes as impossible since "agreement on procedures or a public conception of justice (and hence what counts as a 'reasonable' claim) is made possible only insofar as members of a society already share a common 'form of life,'" (Schaap 2006, 264) as Wittgenstein taught us. As we can see in these cases, the "reasonableness" requirement can serve as a regulative idea and as tools of exclusion. Of course, in "normal" situations, this requirement works as tools to increase efficiency in political deliberations and decisions, but there is absolutely no way of judging when a given situation is normal or abnormal prior to the context of the event. As noted above, we cannot have both efficiency and justice.

In late modernity, where the desires of each individual changes in fleeting ways and you cannot be sure of what you desire by yourself without a cue from commercial advertisements, setting the political goals that most reasonable members of a community agree upon and settling on the prescriptions that can achieve those goals through the procedure of reflective equilibrium (Rawls 1971) may not always be practicable. Even in "normal" situations it will remain as "a boundary-securing activity" and will surely miss many creative aspects of "democratic world-building" political practices (Zerilli 2012). From the perspective of practice theory, whether an individual's performance is pre-constituted or is a result of her agency depends on how members of a community judge the performance and the social practices that the performance is a part of. This is because the social practice that affects each performance --whether it is a norm, convention, or ideology-- is determined and transformed by the scorekeeping activities of each member of the community. Agonistic politics helps each

member become aware of this fact consciously or unconsciously by offering public agons for political issues.

Accepting the arguments of practice theory and agonistic politics, that subjection and agency are not determined by predetermined rules, naturally leads us to the conclusion that the concept of power based on the dichotomy of domination/subordination is incapable of understanding, for example, the diverse actions of women in late modernity in all dimensions.

IV. Implications of Practice Theory on Multiple Modernities

After this rather detailed explanation of practice theory, I am poised to explore the implications of my claims on the relation between Confucianism and modernity. My theory of social practices provides the general theory of social stability and efficiency. It makes clear that stability and efficiency are two conflicting requirements and the society should choose an optimum point determined by tradeoffs between them.[9] This optimum point will depend on the abilities of each agent to make normative judgments. When there is enough trust among agents, each agent can attempt risky but creative choices, thus improving the efficiency without necessarily hurting stability. Otherwise, most of members will devote their precious time and efforts on maintaining the current criteria of judgment ever wary of free-riders, even when the society urgently needs to make a transition to new optimal point due to the change of internal and/or external conditions.[10] Among two responses to the changed social milieu in late modernity discussed by William Connolly (2002), taking a chance for attempting creative new practices and resorting to regressive fundamentalism for fear of speed of social change will correspond to the former and the latter respectively.

More importantly, the possibility of each agent making risky but creative choices, thus improving the efficiency without hurting stability, critically depends on her cognitive abilities. For example, in late modern Korea, over 70 percent of young women and men enter the college with the number of women entering colleges exceeding the corresponding number of men. This fact could hopefully translate into a higher level of abilities for normative judgments and the enormously expanded space of social practices they are capable of searching around. Of course, they are frustrated by the current forms of social practices they are sharing with older and less educated generations of people whereas the latter in turn lament on spoiled young people. The fast disappearing well-paid jobs in manufacturing and other traditional industries that allowed Korea to achieve miraculous economic development also did not help in reducing woes and competitions among young Koreans either.[11] However their enhanced coping skills will eventually help them establish a new set of social practices replacing older ones that have been quite effective in the previous generation, but obsolete now. Of course, their attempts for new

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[9] For similar viewpoints, see Okun (2015) and Knight (1992).

[10] I believe the present neoliberalized Korean society closely approximates this kind of anomalous state in a certain sense.

[11] For example, some young men, driven out of the last and easy resort to take comfort in their patriarchal power, are beginning to regard young, sometimes better educated, women as their potential competitors rather than rich sources of creativity and diversity. This attitude is sometimes accused of as one of causes of some alarming incidents of violence against young women that in turn provoke among them strong protest and hatred against men.

social practices do not guarantee their efforts will be rewarded with more efficient society.[12] They could easily end up with worse or no better results as did the initial high hopes for the Arab Spring. But even in that case they will gain valuable experiences helping them avoid similar pitfalls next time as will do those Arabian young people.

Practice theory shows that any society has its own rational system of social practices as a solution for the problem of allowing its members to manage their social lives fluently, minimizing conflicts, hence inefficiency. For example, members of hunting and gathering societies have a fairly efficient functioning system of natural and social knowledges helping them manage their lives in a logical manner just as modern people utilize their common sense to the same purpose (Geertz 2000, 73-93). To each member, these systems or social practices have both negative function of constraining her agency and positive function of not only expanding her possible options of life but also, more importantly, imagining what is possible for her. For example, as the most important example of social practices, discursive practices literally circumscribe what each member of a society, individually or collectively, can imagine, hence achieve. As discussed in the section 3, this expressive positive freedom thus made possible is an example of normative positive freedom that Brandom attributes to Kant for making it the principal character of his new concept of positive freedom. Simply put, by accepting the constraints imposed on her by a social practice, she can literally extend what is possible in her life.

Instead of formal institutions such as democracy and a modern government with its legislative and judicial branches and the modern concepts of liberty, justice, and equality, the core of the project of modernity and what makes the modern really modern is that a society changes through the changes of its social practices which in turn are initiated by normative positive freedom exercised by each of its members. And this normative positive freedom is constituted from the social practices available and is circumscribed but not completely limited by them. These formal institutions and concepts helped and will continue to help many people initiate their own versions of rational reconstructions and focus their efforts on most urgent social injustices and inefficiencies. But with most of major inefficiencies removed or due to be removed, more diverse strategies should be offered. Of course, a society can relapse and old maladies could return but an increasing number of people are willing to take risk and, with vastly enhanced coping skills that they are equipped with through the help of "poor man's project of modernity," their confidence seems to be not so audacious.

These claims suggest a new way of approaching the current discussions on the Confucian modernity. Instead of searching for and analyzing institutions and concepts in the Confucian tradition with as many common characteristics with the ideal ones of mostly Western origin as possible, we can formalize their structure and property to the fullest limit, thus providing the theoretical common ground on which can compare and discuss their respective roles and characters. Note that this is a completely different issue from the existence of objective criteria

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[12] Similarly simply establishing the formal social system of the public sphere will not guarantee all the seemingly desirable consequences of modernity as Habermas sometimes implies. For example, Dreyfus approvingly cites Kierkegaard's laments on the same "press and coffee houses" that Habermas locates the origin of the public sphere in the eighteenth century Europe, claiming that "his age is characterized by a disinterested reflection and curiosity that level all differences of status and value." (Dreyfus 2009, 73-89).

that can compare their relative efficiencies for example. The common ground I am suggesting exists on the different theoretical level (or we could say metatheoretical level) from that. Terminologies of practice theory will make this possible.

Before starting discussion of the Confucian modernity and its concept of the public, we first have to locate Habermas's theory of modernity and public sphere in the current Western intellectual terrain with its relation to practice theory in mind. One of the main intellectual sources for Habermas's theories is pragmatism but trying to be faithful to the tradition of critical theory that holds on the Enlightenment ideal of "rational criticism of existing institutions" causes him unnecessary theoretical burden according to pragmatists (Rorty 1991, 164). For example, according to practice theory, his ""notion of ideal speech situation" is a wheel which plays no part in the mechanism of social criticism." (Geuss, quoted in Rorty 1991, 167). Just as Zerilli pointed out in her criticism of the public reason advocated by Rawls, the American counterpart of Habermas in their common support of deliberative politics, it rather could unnecessarily restrict the possibility that "significant differences of perspective can be publically voiced and critically judged" when a common world that such a concept implicitly presuppose no longer exists (Zerilli 2012, 9). However, many other aspects of Habermas's theory tend to be perfectly acceptable to practice theorists especially in those versions revealed in the later works.

Another point that must be pointed out is that many scholars in support of or in sympathy of the relevance of Confucianism in this modernized world base some of their arguments on their criticism of social maladies caused by neoliberalization along with globalization. These maladies are especially severe in some East Asian countries that achieved miraculous economic developments but did not have enough time to experiment and search for optimal social practices suitable to those drastically changed social conditions including those involving various social welfare systems and safety networks. In the traditional theory of economics, this should not be such a deep problem. But as has been amply demonstrated in recent cases such as providing prescriptions for turning the centralized economic systems of former member countries of the Soviet Union into the capitalist market ones, changes of social practices can take much longer and neglecting this fact can cause serious social problems. Practice theory can correct this kind of serious defects of the traditional economic theory in a systematic manner though in its current form it has not achieved such a level of formalization as rational choice theory and game theory. However, even in the current form, practice theory provides a wider and better perspective on the social problems caused by neoliberalization. From this perspective, the Confucian modernity and the so-called Western modernity, but more exactly neoliberalized modernity in this context, that these scholars are criticizing, are two arguably representative ways of organizing social practices to achieve the stability of nation-state with more or less efficiency that have been achieved through more than or nearly a millennium old political experiments.

What I want to raise cautious objection against is the way these scholars and their western counterparts tend to regard these two options as two competing ways of organizing our present and future political systems and, by implications, accompanying social practices. Or at least both groups regard their respective concept of modernity as the main component of the new emerging options. Practice theory claims such tendency will unnecessarily restrict the options

we are willing to consider despite their inevitable risk. Many changed social conditions, most of them made possible because of successful economic developments, allowed such attempts less risky: freedom from fear of poverty that would have discouraged us from changing political and social institutions however inefficient and oppressing they may had been, the spread of universal education culminating in the appearance of highly educated young generations with a heightened level of civil citizenship and coping skills, and finally ICT revolution that accelerated the spread of higher coping skills including rising political sensibility among the whole populace. This process can be seen clearly in the case of South Korea as has been discussed by many authors but more or less similar ones can also be seen in East and South Asian countries including India. I would like summarize these phenomena as characteristics of late modernity.

V. Conclusion

I have emphasized that many attempts or searches for a widened spectrum of social options and experiments, the most extreme examples being coined as world-building activity by Arendt, always involve risks of degenerating into anomalous or inefficient practices. The possibility of these two directly opposing consequences is an intrinsic character of such attempts and cannot be separated. This is also what makes these attempts attractive, both fearful and adventurous. Now many scholars advocating the Confucian modernity tend to view many characteristics of late modernity that are sources for such risky but creative attempts as causes of current social maladies. I believe this is the main reason why the Confucian modernity as their prescription against such "maladies" receive at best lukewarm responses from women and young people in particular.

For better and eager responses to be possible, they would have to offer better arguments why the Confucian modernity is capable of offering conceptual tools, allowing these group of people to attempt the new options and prospects this late modern landscape opens up while providing the wisdom and spiritual comports that it has gained through a long years of social and political experiments. At least they should be able to explain why women and young people need not worry about relapsing to old and one of the ugliest oppressions on them in human history.

This leads to another possibly problematic arguments offered in support of the Confucian modernity: its active embracing of concept of the unity of Heaven and Humanity (天人合一). Park Young-Do (2014) argued that the first step for the Confucian deliberative politics to make transition to democratic deliberative politics possible is critical restructuring of Neo-Confucian rationality or, in other words, the concept of the unity of Heaven and Humanity.[13] The possibility of constraining human agency such a concept implies is a serious problem as I have argued in the above. I would also like to add another reason why the Neo-Confucian theory of the unity of Heaven and Humanity needs a serious job of restructuring. Consider, for example, the possibility of building environmental ethics based on it that has been frequently claimed to

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[13] Astute readers will find many similarities between his arguments and mine given section 3.

be one of its merits compared to the Western one. The problem of this kind of claims is closely related to the lacuna peculiar in the theory of Confucian modernity, that is, the absence of clear theoretical viewpoint on the relation of natural scientific knowledges and the Confucianism. Whereas almost all philosophers majoring Western philosophy acknowledge the full efficacy of natural scientific methods, Confucian scholars are mostly dubious about this issue. This will not help in gaining supports from the wide spectrum of people in late modernity, even in East Asia.

Then what is the main attractive points in the remaining part of the Confucian modernity? As can be seen from practice theory, the formation of a stable and efficient social practice is a rare process depending strongly on its local and historical contexts. But this same fact guarantees its long lifetime, in many cases beyond its efficacy since they are the principal tools through which each member of a society imagine, manage, and create in her life. Without diverse social practices, she will have little to achieve in her life. This means the Confucianism still and will still remain an important conceptual tools for those in East Asia as scholars of the Confucian modernity claim. However practice theory also emphasizes that every human agent is an expert of adaptation that transforms and modifies given tools, whether they are of concrete or conceptual tools, and most of achievements the present civilization, including scientific knowledges, can be safely claimed to the results of this ability. This in turn means that whatever remains in the present form of the Confucian modernity will be transformed, most likely, beyond recognition to most of these scholars when we consider the drastic changes the present late modern social terrain seems to be heading to.

I believe the arguments given in the above strongly urge that the scholars in sympathy of the Confucian modernity confront important conceptual and theoretical works still waiting for their innovative efforts. They should more actively incorporate many scientific intuitions available from the recent research works in the scientific fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and behavioral economics into their project of modifying and revising the Confucianism. This will turn Confucianism into a suitable and hence efficient form of theoretical framework that can help members of a society easily adapt and invent new prospects and experiments in their lives. In particular, the present form of *Qing* and *Li* theory handed down from the period of Zhu Xi, despite almost millennium old efforts of excellent Confucian scholars, seriously require renovation by incorporating the modern scientific knowledges.[14] Though very difficult and demanding, this project will be almost the only way and very promising way of transforming the Confucian discourses that have been going on during the last half century.

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[14] For example, the ability of empathy that are shown to be essential for the common good are of evolutionary origin as has been analyzed through innovative and creative research efforts by the scientists in the above mentioned disciplines (Bowles and Gintis 2013). Relying on the traditional *Qing* and *Li* theory to do similar jobs of justifying the communitarian ethics does not seem to be so auspicious considering this kind of scientific developments.

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Survivalist Spirituality and Theology of Problems
Focusing on Pastor Cho Yong-Gi

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* Due to the incomplete nature of this article, I respectfully ask that you refrain from quoting it at this time.

Introduction

During past several years, I have presented the argument that Korean modernity can be explained and understood substantially from a viewpoint of what I term the 'survivalism' (Hong-Jung Kim, 2015b; Hong-Jung Kim, 2015c; Hong-Jung Kim, 2015d; Hong-Jung Kim, 2018). I define survivalism as a form of governmentality articulated with a collective psychic structure, functioning as a norms of conduct, which stipulates and legitimates the supreme importance of the survival and its semantical derivatives (literal surviving of a bare life, success, victory in the competition, overcoming fatal crises, etc.). Survivalism is a cultural logic underlying institutional, organization, and even ideological realities of Korean society; it endorses secretly the prioritization of the task of surviving to the detriment of other significant official values or causes; it ratifies consequently the concentration of resources on that problem.

As a historical construct, survivalism is composed of diverse elements, such as ideologies (survivalist knowledges claiming the truth), dispositions (survivalist habitus), imaginaries (survivalist dreams or utopian representations), and *dispositif* of subjectification (survivalist apparatuses). All of these components constitute, in tandem, a survivalist regime that governs the social macroscopically, and the psychic, or more specifically, to utilize the concept that I present in this research, the spiritual of the subjects, on the microscopic plane.

On the basis of this operationalization of the concept of survivalism or survivalist modernity[1], I have contended that there have been 3 major paradigms of survivalist regimes, throughout 20th century Korean history. The first of these was the 'International Law (萬國公法) survivalist regime' which was constituted of a series of shocks caused by the 1894 Sino-Japanese war, the Donghak Peasant Revolution (東學農民革命), and the Kabo reform (甲午改革). Following this, the second paradigm was the 'Cold War survivalist regime' that took shape in the aftermath of the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. The final was the 'neo-liberalist survivalist regime' that came into being in the pressing reaction to the 1997 IMF foreign currency crisis. Among those three waves of survivalism, I have focused as yet on the Cold War survivalist regime, in probing into two major cases representative of survivalist governmentality (Hong-Jung Kim, 2015b; Hong-Jung Kim, 2018): political governmentality

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[1] During past 3 decades, Korean sociology and social thought presented a series of intriguing analyses ((Chang, 2010; Duk-Young Kim, 2014; Moon, 2005; Sang-Jun Kim, 2011; Eun-Joo Chang, 2014; Sun-Young Yoo, 1997).

of Park Chung-Hee (朴正熙, 1917-1979) and entrepreneurial governmentality of Jung Joo-Young (鄭周永, 1915-2001).

In line with these previous studies on the survivalist governmentality peculiar to Cold War developmental period of Korea, I attempt at making inquiry into another important and intriguing theme concerned with survivalist modernity. That is what I propose to call the 'survivalist spirituality' whose most telling example is found in the theology of Pastor Cho Yong-Gi (趙鏞基), a renowned founder of the Korean Pentecostal mega-church, Yoido Full Gospel Church (YFGC, 汝矣島純福音敎會). As is well-known, Cho is one of Korea's charismatic religious figures who first started his church in May 1958 with only 5 followers, growing membership to nearly 800,000 in the 1990s, making it the largest scale mega-church[2] in the world: Yoido Full Gospel Church (YFGC, 汝矣島純福音敎會). It is indisputable that the growth of the YFGC has been analogous in scale and period alike to that of Korea's capitalist economy (Myung-Soo Park, 2014:79; Jong-Hyun Park, 2008). What is even more intriguing, however, is that Cho's theological thought exemplified the collective psyche of Koreans during the developmental era, and that the themes and logics of Cho's theology embodied, better than any other forms of discursive formation, the mode of thinking, feeling, and dreaming by reference to which modern Koreans forged their own subjectivity and their social realities.

Through the image of God as eternally merciful and forgiving, his Full Gospel doctrine awakened, recognized, and even sanctified the will to survive and the desire to surmount material predicaments, in particular, for those who were left destitute and hopeless, crushed under the weight of life following the Korean War. In tune with the growth of the middle-class owing to the successful industrialization in the 1970s, Cho came to proselytize his unique 'can-doism' in stressing the worth of dreams and vision. It seems no exaggeration to say that Cho's theology is one of the most vivid representations of the Korean survivalist modernity. The realistic portraits of the pauperized and wretched people of the times, as well as the psycho-scape charged with their desires and suffering, are interwoven into his theological system, and his doctrines are saturated with the both light and dark side of the survivalism. He was not only a famous and influential Christian leader, but an evangelist or missionary of the dream of survival, prosperity, and development on the national dimension.

Applying Weberian Insight

In fact, there exist a huge amount of researches on the subject of Pastor Cho's theology, ministry, pastoral practices, and also the rapid growth or organizational peculiarities of YFGC, by Korean scholars (Sung Hoon Myung, 1990; Boo Woong Yoo, 1988) as well as foreign scholars. It is practically impossible to present an overview of important previous literature, on account of the variety of disciplines concerned, numerical abundance of the studies already

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[2] A mega-church is defined as one with over 10,000 attending adults at a Sunday service, receiving over 100 million won (roughly $100,000 U.S.) in tithes each week. There are more than 20 of these mega-churches in South Korea (Sung-Gun Kim, 2013: 6-7).

produced, and irregularity of the academic quality. In addition, Cho's theology and YFGC has been the subject of the fervent controversies in the academy as well as in the public space of Korean society. YFGC established its own university, educates pastors and theologians, helping to produce a good amount of discourses favorable to Cho's theological directions. To mention only sociologically-conducted and significantly noteworthy studies, I would like to present the following several explorations (Jin Hong Chung, 1981; Wan Sang Han, 1981; Sung Gun Kim, 2006; Sung Gun Kim, 2012; Jin Ho Kim, 2012; Jung-Yon Lee, 2018).

In this article addressing Cho's theology in relation to Korean survivalist modernity, I will focus my theoretical horizon on Max Weber's perspective on religion, materialized in particular in his article "Protestant Ethic and Spirit of the Capitalism" published in 1904-1905 (Weber, 1930). I argue that in this monumental article in the history of sociological theory, Weber paved the way for the sociological understanding and explaining of 'becoming subject' under the complicated orchestration of ideas, desires, devices, and practices. The concepts such as ethos, psychological motivation (*psychologishe Antrieb*), spirit, attitude (*Gesinnung*) are mobilized in a bid to elucidate the way how a human being is transformed into a subject, whether it be Protestant (Calvinist) or capitalist. To draw on Weberian insights in the study of a specific theological discursive form such as the Protestant ethic, means to explicate i) the singularities of the theological ideas or doctrines (predestinarianism in Calvinism)), ii) the mode of subjectification that the ideas realize in interactions of the believers (preaching of this-worldly asceticism), iii) the subject-form which results from that subjectification-process (Calvinist-capitalist). The capitalistic order of the social is considered as a consequence of the long-term process of this subjectification effectuated under the influence of Calvinist religiosity. If I intend to draw on Weber's perspective to the explanation of Cho's theology, I need to follow the aforementioned scheme of analysis.

However, there is an interesting problem, in this attempt. To wit, Max Weber's analysis did not comprise the Pentecostalism to which Cho's YFGC belongs. As is well known, in his text of 1904-5, 4 distinct ideal types of Protestantism were presented: Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, and Baptist sects. As for the Pentecostalism, we know that the first historical revival movement took place in 1906, in Azusa Street of Los Angeles. Max Weber did not mention Pentecostal movements, not to mention its influences upon 20th century capitalism, although 20th century Christianity is represented by the massive growth of Pentecostal spirituality in many parts of the world, for instance, in Latin America, Africa, and East Asia. It is incontestable nevertheless that Weber's insight is still relevant to the understanding of the Pentecostalism religiosity, according to a host of important studies on the subject.

It is in this theoretical context that I venture to apply Weberian approach to Cho's theology, by interrogating three pivotal themes constitutive of Weber's sociology of religion: analysis of main theological ideas, mode of subjectification, and subject-form. According to my analysis, Cho's theology is based on a constellation of basic ideas that I will term 'theology of problems'. Secondly, I will show that he invented a specific mode of subjectifying the most disempowered people of post-war Korean society subjected to the urgencies of survival problems into an incredibly active and fervent agents, by introducing most efficaciously the power of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the mode of subjectification particular to Cho's theology lies in his pneumatological practices comprising divine healing, glossolalia, and all

kinds of intensive and visceral way of experiencing the transcendental power. Finally, I will show the specific form of the subject produced in this process of subjectification is characterized by what I call the desperate optimist (dreamer) who incarnated the developmentalism or survivalism of the epoch. Cho's theology of problems foregrounded, implemented, actualized the survivalist spirituality of the Cold War Korean developmental society, governed by authoritarian dictator Park Chung-Hee.

Yong-Gi Cho and Full Gospel Church[3]

Yong-Gi Cho was born in February 1936, to a former gentile family living in Gyeongsangbuk-do Wooljoo-gun. He lived an ordinary childhood through the colonial period, graduating from Dong-rae middle school. In 1952, as the Korean War raged on, he was admitted to Busan Technical High School. But in 1953 he experienced a life changing accident. After falling from a chin-up bar while exercising, Cho hurt his chest and began to cough up blood. The results of a medical examination exposed that Cho had stage-three tuberculosis. He fell deep into despair. During this time, he happened to meet an American missionary named Kenneth Tice, who he interpreted for at revival assemblies, meanwhile beginning to read Christian texts and familiarizing himself with its doctrines and spirituality. It was at this point that while praying during a fast, he had a vision: Jesus came to him and assured that he would heal his lungs if Cho were to live the rest of his life as his servant. Cho promised to do so, and was filled with the Spirit of God. On this occasion, he converted from Buddhism to Christianity. Moving up to Seoul, Cho entered the 'Full Gospel Bible College,' which belonged to the Assemblies of God denomination, located in Seodaemun. This was in September of 1956. It was there that he met the woman who would become his most important partner in his later pastoral and missionary work, Pastor Ja-Shil Choi (崔字實, 1915-1989).[4]

On May 18th, 1958 Yong-Gi Cho, Ja-Shil Choi and her children formed their first family church. As membership grew due to rumors of miracle working and divine healing, they used a canvas tent discarded by American soldiers for their ministry. During this time Cho witnessed the hopes, fears, and needs of the Korean people — those who had emigrated south during the war, and those who emigrated to Seoul for jobs, as well as the poor — as they lived through the psycho-social ruins of the Korean War. In 1961, he established the 'Full Gospel Revival Center' in a five-story building at the Seodaemun intersection. Membership grew to 2,000 in 1964, and leaped to 8000 in 1968. In 1973, just as nascent development was first

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[3] In regard to Cho's biography, see Kennedy (1980), Dong-Hee Ryoo (2011: 39-68), International Theological Study Institute (2008). There is also an autobiographical account, see Yong-Gi, Cho (2008).

[4] Pastor Ja-Shil Choi was born on August 15th, 1951 in Haeju, Hwanghae-do and graduated from Pyongyang Provincial Nursing School in 1935, after which she married in 1940, having one son and two daughters (one of whom later married Yong-Gi Cho). Though she was able to gain monetary success through her work as a nurse and other enterprises, a series of tough problems pushed her into such psychological suffering that she attempted suicide. At the recommendation of pastor Sung-Bong Lee she started school at the Full Gospel Bible College where she worked as head of witnessing. In 1972, she was ordained and in January of 1973 she established the International Fasting Prayer House in Osan-ri, Gyeonggi-do. She passed away in 1989 (Ja-Shil Choi, 2005).

started on Seoul's deserted island of Yoido, Cho decided to build a colossal church there, naming it the 'Yoido Full Gospel Church', opening the 'age of Yoido' on August 19th of that year.

Far from being esoteric or pedantic, Cho's sermons were rich in spirited allegories and metaphors easily accessible to a popular audience. The curious mixture of regional dialect and English intonation contributes to his idiosyncratic rhythmic elocution style that "was faster than a heartbeat" in delivering a message in a high tone, with repeated expressions and frequent use of enumeration and climaxes that "had the effect of hooking the congregation's heart and reeling it in" (In-Kyo Chung, 2009: 248). Cho's preaching utilized and even institutionalized enthusiastic and energetic practices such as divine healing, speaking in tongues, loud prayers (通聲祈禱), incessant 'amen' and 'hallelujah' to preaching, rapid hand-clapping while singing hymns, and all-night prayers; he created a peculiar sermon culture brought on by the combination of collective enthusiasm of Pentecostal revivals of the Spirit, and Korea's local shamanistic spirituality. For example, according to Jin-Hong Chung, who conducted fieldwork while participating in rituals of Full Gospel services from May to August of 1981, the Church's sermons were markedly devoid of formalistic rigor, saying that in spite of the striking "communal moods" and "enthusiastic moods", the burden of *metanoia* proper to Christianity was extremely attenuated (Jin-Hong Chung, 1981: 113-8). Sociologist Wan-Sang Han shared a similar opinion after conducting participant observation during such rituals:

"There arises a deep sense of communion among spectators listening to the sermon from the pulpit. A type of 'zone of sympathy' is formed (…). After the sermon, the mysterious orgy reaches its peak (…). This is most dramatic during the group healing sessions. After the preacher's earnest calls to God asking that he grant a miracle so that all may not leave empty handed, a collective healing of the sick occurs (…). When the preacher declares "those whose backs were hurt and could not stand have now been healed" the congregation unanimously yell out 'hallelujah' and applaud. When the preacher calls for those who have had illnesses cured like this to rise, here and there people will begin to stand. The congregation once again gives a lively response. A sense that all are one in the heat of the Spirit hangs in the air. It is an emotionally-lived communal atmosphere which you cannot experience at an established church, especially at nominal or intellectualist churches" (Wan-Sang Han, 1981: 207-8).

The landscape Han observed at the height of the YFGC's growth in the early 1980s is not actually the pure invention of Cho, but is rather a part of the broader culture of Korean Protestantism starting in the early 20th century. It is widely acknowledged that this tendency of emphasizing direct or personal communion with the Holy Spirit had been witnessed already in the renowned original revival movement in Korean history led by Pastor Sun-Joo Gil (吉善宙, 1869-1935) in 1907 at the Changdaehyun Church in Pyongyang, which afterwards was passed down continuously through prominent revivalists such as Ik-Doo Kim (金益斗, 1874-1950), Myeong-Jik Lee (李明稙, 1890-1973), Eung-Jo Kim (金應祖, 1896-1991), and Sung-Bong Lee (李聖鳳, 1900-1965) (Myung-Soo Park, 2003). From the sixties and into the seventies the

revival rallies moved into the streets and the downtown square. Furthermore, the occurrences of collective effervescence in prayer houses (祈禱院) that had been actively established after the Korean War were not unusual aspects of practicing faith in Korean Christianity (Heung-Su Kim, 1999: 161). Cho spliced together Pentecostal faith and these contextual or indigenous factors, creating a novel spirituality tailored to the hearts of modern Koreans (Sung-Gun Kim, 2006).[5] Practices such as trances, fortune-praying, healing and spiritual gifts, manifestations of the miraculous, unfettered discharge of emotions exceeding the bounds of rationality, and 'theology of blessings' (which I will discuss in more detail later) have given rise to the suspicion that the spirituality of the Full Gospel Church is homologous to that of shamanism (Hunt & McMahon, 1985: 143-5; Cox, 1994: 219-262; Hollenweger, 1997: 99-105; Martin, 1993: 144).

Meanwhile, Cho has not only been an active and pioneering figure in his enthusiastic utilization of modern media[6], the home cell group system, aggressive international missionary work, and the establishment of Hansei University and Bethesda University (USA, LA), but also has published multiple books in both Korean and English starting from the 1970s. As a consequence of these endeavors, the membership of his church that had once been centered on the urban poor, grew to embrace the middle class after the 1970s, legitimizing theologically their desire for prosperity and success, leading to not a mere expansion but an "explosion" of growth, to borrow an expression from Comiskey (Comiskey, 2003: 223). To put it concretely, the church started in 1958 with five members, reaching 7,790 members in 1967; 12,556 in 1973; 100,933 in 1979; 200,144 in 1981; 645,296 in 1991; 733,253 in 1997; and reaching a peak of 788,441 in 2003 (Yoido Full Gospel Church 50-year Anniversary Compilation Committee, 2008: 432), solidifying its reign as the largest mega-church in the world. In doing so, the YFGC became a symbol of miraculous Korean church growth, and Yong-Gi Cho cemented his place as an icon of charismatic ministry of the first magnitude in Korean society. It is important however, not to reduce the meaning of this success to simply a 'religious' context in a narrow sense of the word, but to detect in it an eloquent clue which permits us to elucidate a certain rationale illustrative of basic structure of the dream of Korean modernity.

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[5] On account of this, Full Gospel Church's creed had long been subject to intense debate within the Christian community. Finally, at the 1983, 68th general meeting of the Presbyterian Church of Korea, Cho was designated as a cult-leader. For the following 10 years debate ensued. After establishing a research committee and thoroughly examining Cho's writings, the 79th general meeting of the Presbyterian Church of Korea in 1994 reported that "Pastor Yong-Gi Cho's theology can be attributed to the uniqueness of the Pentecostal theology," thus retracting their earlier stance (Yoido Full Gospel Church 50-year anniversary compilation committee, 2008: 157-8).

[6] Starting in 1966 Cho began broadcasting 'Full Gospel time,' a radio program through the Far East Broadcasting Company (International Theological Institute, 427-8). On February 5th, 1967, he created the quarterly magazine, *Faith* (信仰界). In 1980, with the start of Daejeon's MBC-TV, for 30 minutes a week, Cho's sermons were broadcast over TV. In July of 1985, his English sermons were broadcast 30 minutes a week on AFKN-TV (channel 2). The same year, Asia Broadcasting began playing his sermons for 15 minutes daily in China. In 1988, Cho created the daily newspaper *Kukmin Daily*. As the era of cable broadcasting opened in the 90s, the Full Gospel Church actively utilized mass media in order to raise its visibility within Korean society (Yoido Full Gospel Church 50-year Anniversary Compilation Committee, 2008: 101-2; 148-9; 174-5). For his 60th birthday, Cho published the 24-volume collection *Pastor Yong-Gi Cho's Complete Sermons*. Volume one begins with sermons from 1974.

The Primal Landscape of Yong-Gi Cho's Theology

An anecdote from 1958, during the period that Cho ran his ministry from Daejo-dong, gives us a significant picture for comprehending the core of his theology. In *Do You Really Want Church Growth?* (1995) Cho recalls an episode where he was evangelizing to an impoverished family which had been thrown into dire circumstances; the husband was an alcoholic, the children degenerated into pick-pocketing and shoe-shining, and the mother suffering from a combination of ailments. As soon as Cho approached the mother and said, "Ma'am, believe in Christ and you will go to heaven," she replied, glaring at him scornfully, "What heaven? I'm not even afraid of Hell. If there really were a God, why doesn't he give us what we need right now?" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 85-6).

This exchange came as quite a shock to Cho. He discovered that there was an unbridgeable rupture between the world of theological speculations and the world of "those who had gone mad, having lost anything resembling a sanctuary" so who were "roaming the streets without objective, wailing aloud" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1979: 6). The allegedly orthodox Christian creed that he had learned in seminary school rigorously demanded *metanoia* (repentance) from sinners, with a message of the horrors of hell and longing for heaven. But Cho realized that this kind of austere discourse could not move the hearts of the people. He took the aforementioned experience with the poor woman as a decisive chance to reexamine the bible from an entirely new angle. He confesses to have been astonished to find that Jesus was not depicted as a punishing and damning figure by any means, but as one of forgiving, healing, blessing, that helped solve our dilemmas. Jesus was not only preaching of an otherworldly heaven but also the beatification of this world; not only the salvation of our souls, but also the prosperity of the flesh and material. Cho writes the following about this awakening:

> "Jesus Christ forgave the transgressions of sinners and chased away demons. He healed those who were ill and revived those who were dead, he fed the starving, and also, he quieted the storms. After doing so, Jesus Christ asked the people to believe in him (…). Therefore, in meeting Christ many people had their spiritual problems settled, their illnesses cured, and even matters of material reality solved. That is to say, through being saved, their problems of the spirit and body, as wells as all other matters, were resolved. This was the reason that the masses made such an effort to meet Jesus Christ (…). A majority of Christ's teachings were related to life on this earth; how one's life could change by the power of the Kingdom of God; how one's needs could be satisfied by the kingdom of God (…). As Christ has said yesterday, today, and always, "**Beloved, I pray that thou may prosper in all things and be in health, just as your soul prospers**" (3 John 1:2)" (Yong-Gi, Cho, 1995: 87-9. Emphasis added).

Having witnessed such collective sentiment of frustration, Cho ruminated over the problem of 'survival' that simultaneously permeated both the physical and material levels of existence. The urban poor that he met groaned under the weight of the practical tasks of their everyday lives. They held no lofty views of salvation, but yearned precisely for one-dimensional sustenance of life. Cho's theology keenly took hold of this type of 'crisis of

survival' situation (Hyuk-Seung Kwon, 2004: 12). To utilize a brilliant expression of theologian Boo-Woong Yoo, the people that Cho encountered were not the revolutionary historical subject referred to as "Minjung(民衆)-ochlos"[7], but rather a people stricken by harsh realities, dis-empowered and injured, deprived of political vision, striving for bare survival and, by extension, existential prosperity; a people which can be appropriately called the "Pentecostal Minjung(民衆)" (Boo-Woong, Yoo, 1988: 206-227). Cho's contextualized Pentecostal theology was historically rooted in these circumstances of utmost urgency and emergency which promoted the formation of *han* (恨), understood as Korean national affective tonality of the oppressed people (Park Andrew S. 1993; Anderson, 2003: 93-8).

Inquiring into the theological meaning of poverty, suffering, persecution, and destitution in this way, Cho questioned seriously the theological legitimacy, or properly speaking, the theodicy of suffering (Yong-Gi, Cho, 1980: 27). The answer he ultimately presented to these questions turned out to be more or less problematic, in that he relegated the Christian meaning of persecution to the shadows, and in exchange emphasized the right and necessity to be emancipated from it. According to the interpretation of the gospel in Cho's thinking, God so loved the world that he spilled the blood of his only begotten son, so that humanity's sins would be washed away definitively, and promised those with faith eternal life. It is not a "message of judgement, but of salvation" (Yong-Gi, Cho, 1997: 38). The world was already liberated from sin; that was the meaning of Jesus' spilt blood. God no longer wanted punishment. On the contrary, what he desired was man's jubilation. This gospel proclaimed by Cho was the very voice that people had craved from the church. Cho fleshed out this idea under the rubric of the 'three-beat salvation(三拍子救援)' or the 'three-fold blessing(三重祝福).'[8]

Though the first time that this concept was contrived was in the 1977 text *Three-Beat Salvation* and the 1983 work *The Five-fold Gospel and Three-beat Blessing,* essential insights constitutive of this doctrine could already be traced back to earlier texts and sermons after the 1960s and 1970s. The fundamental logic of his 'three-fold blessing' was, as mentioned above, succinctly encapsulated in 3 John, "Beloved, I pray that thou may prosper in all things and be in health, just as your soul prospers." The discovery of this verse had crucial impact on Cho's theology (Yong-Gi Cho, 1977: 18)[9]. He writes, "After that, this scripture became the base of all my sermons and ministry. When I worked through the scripture from Genesis to The Book

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[7] 'Minjung' is the transliteration of the Korean word '민중', which Minjung theology uses commonly. Unlike the Pentecostal church that focuses on the teachings of the Gospel of Luke and the Act of Apostles, Minjung theology highlights the Gospel of Mark where groups of Jesus's followers are called 'ochlos'. In this paper, I will reserve 'Minjung' to indicate those related to the Minjung theology and will use the term 'people' in other cases.

[8] The term 'three-beat' was derived from the language and behavior of the people that participated in Cho's services. Observing the titillating scene of worshippers applauding during service, Cho came up with the term 'three-beat.' Despite explaining in his book, *The Five-fold Gospel and the Three-beat Blessing* (1983) that 'three-beat' and 'three-fold' mean the same thing (Yong-Gi Cho, 1983: 239-240), the use of 'three-beat blessing' stopped abruptly and was replaced by the 'three-fold blessing' (Hyuk-Seung Kwon, 2004: 13-4). I will use the term 'three-fold' uniformly in this paper.

[9] This verse was actually inspired by Oral Roberts, an American divine-healing activist. After the Second World War, Roberts published *If You Need Healing Do These Things* (1948), in which that verse was repeated. After receiving the book from an American friend, Cho became a passionate supporter of Roberts. He manifested this fact in the 'testimonial' section (Yong-Gi Cho, 1998a: 8) of the Korean translation of Roberts' *Expect a Miracle* (Dong-Hee Ryoo, 2011: 143). For more on the American 'prosperity theology' that influenced Cho, see (Jang-Hyun Ryoo, 2010).

of Revelations with the three-beat salvation, I began to see that the God I believed in was not only God of the past and future, but a God of the present that was alive and loves and cares for me" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1977: 18). The verse enumerates clearly three focal realms of the divine blessing: soul, body, and business. To put it slightly differently, these are "spiritual redemption", "daily blessing", and "full health" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1983: 73).

Refuting overtly the eschatological conception of Kingdom of God, Cho unfolds a substantially different image of it. That is, the heavenly Kingdom preached by him resembles a universe in which progress and prosperity are promised and predestined. It is not a transcendental reality beyond our reach, but this secular world itself impregnated with God's three-fold blessings.[10] This kind of optimistic world-view resonated deeply with the people of that period who were coping with their 'problematic reality', something that other Korean churches obsessed with "lofty and sacred faith" (Won-gyu Lee, 1994: 57) could not grasp at the time. Yong-Gi Cho gave the name "Good God" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1977: 20-32), to this newly conceived deity who is believed to be working to alter the real affairs of men, far from remaining an abstract principle. The Good God is "the Lord that grants us blessings" (CCS 2: 43)[11] and is "the origin of blessings" (CCS 2: 158). He is a helper, a healer, a giver, and a redeemer. The Good God empowers man and he fortifies man. Once convinced of the existence and authority of this Good God, man must be devoted to flourishing under his auspice.

The Good God does not only free one from sin, but even enjoins us to accomplish the goals of prosperity as actively as possible. To covet wealth, or to maximize the "creative instinct for success" (CCS 5: 390) is not reducible to a right of man, but rather should be thought of as an obligation imposed on him by God. "There is a responsibility of the utmost gravity for believers in Christ today. That responsibility is to live affluently. If we should live poorly without any exceptional reason, that would be an affront to the Lord" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1977: 138). In the same vein, Cho writes "we cannot help but flourish on all fronts, and we have a duty to flourish. If we should not do well in all things, Jesus's sacrifice upon the cross loses all value" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1977: 145). This attitude was not so much the 'defensive' survivalism of the post-war period as it was a newly emerging 'aggressive' survivalism. His idea of the blessing normalizes the blessed life, positioning it as a taken-for-granted standard. Among other rules of conduct, the duty of accumulating wealth is imperative, and consequently, the failure to accomplish it is judged as a new form of 'sin.' Cho's theory, which identifies poverty as sin effectuates a radical inversion of values. This inversion, however, coincides with the general atmosphere of the 1970s, burning with the aspiration to become affluent.

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[10] The five-fold gospel is a variation on the four gospels of the Pentecostal church, which are the salvation, baptism in the Holy Spirit, divine healing, and the second coming of Christ. Cho amends baptism in the Holy Spirit to fullness of the Spirit, and adds the blessing, completing the five-fold gospel (Yong-Gi Cho, 1983: 49). If the five-fold gospel is "theory and doctrine" then the three-fold blessing can be understood as "the practice and application of the theory and doctrine" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1997: 250).

[11] This is how I will reference *Yong-Gi Cho's Complete Sermons*. CCS standing for Cho's Complete Sermons in acronym, the number of books, and the page.

Theology of Problems

Originating in the matrix of post-war Korean society and evolving through the turbulent and dynamic developmental period, Cho's doctrines and sermons pivot around the recurrent theme of the 'problem', which is the veritable leitmotif of his theology. In his theory, the prototypical Christian topics of sin and salvation are, more often than not, eclipsed by that of a problem-posing and problem-solving circuit. For example, the narrative structure of the three-fold blessing is epitomized in the following consecutive processes: the Good God actively intervenes in the life of someone tormented by various problems, solves them by virtue of the Holy Spirit, and finally leads him to the permanent state of prosperity. In this sense, Cho's doctrines can be referred to as the theology of problems, which is a distinguishingly Korean Christian theology.

In a sermon given in the late 1970s, Cho explains the fall of Adam and the crucifixion of Jesus in the light of this 'problem—solution' framework. According to him, man, who had been exiled from paradise on account of Adam's mistake, was now wrapped up "in problems that he could not resolve on his own" (CCS 5: 130). The only possible answer to these problems came in the form of Christ: "Resolved once again to accomplish and prepare all for humanity, which had been suffering and dying from problems that they could not conquer through their own strength, God so loved the world that he sent his only begotten son. Jesus Christ came to this earth and enlightened us to the will of God in all problems that we as humanity are confronted with" (CCS 5: 133). In the same context, the crucifixion is construed as a dramatic moment of problem-solving: "Jesus condescended to be nailed to the cross, in order to settle all the problems beyond the reach of human capacity (…). God solved entirely every problem that we are colliding with" (CCS 5: 134-5). It is not difficult to notice that the whole history of Christian dialectics such as fall of man and his salvation by the grace of Jesus is transfigured into that of problem-posing and problem-settling. Cho interpreted countless episodes from the Bible through this very perspective of 'problem—solution'. We are even tempted to say that this code of problem/solution takes the precedence over other possible religious codes, such as good/evil, sin/salvation, or divine/secular. This supreme code of problem/solution absorbs, dismantles, and realigns other principles of distinctions, and serves as the most powerful scheme of thinking, feeling, and willing.

In this light, Cho's theology seems not to be struggling against 'evil', 'sin', or 'profanity', but against invincible presence of a wide-ranging of 'problems' in human life. Human being is portrayed as inescapably trapped in a quasi-functionalist circuit of 'desire—fulfillment', and as a consequent ontologically entangled in a web of problems that he has no ability to escape (CCS 2: 254). Problems constitute, in this way, an existential inevitability of human life. The starting point of overcoming this situation is given when human being adopts a positive mode of thinking, according to which problems may have certain functions; once one solves problems without being overwhelmed by them, they finally turn into the paradoxical fuel for one's prosperity. That is how development is realized. Problems thus contain concealed value for those who surmount them. Thereupon rests the role of the church and the ministry. The church must provide the best prescriptions of how to solve problems effectively. "Ministry is like this. First, you must **diagnose the realistic problems** as well as the spiritual state of those

coming to your church. Following this, through prayer and the Word, they will meet Jesus Christ, who **satisfies their needs**, and in doing so will **have their problems resolved**" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 69-70. Emphasis added). He also says, "We must satisfy the urgent needs of people. That is extremely important. We must both give people hope, as well as satisfy their realistic needs" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 80).[12]

It is in this regard that Cho's theology of problems exhibits striking resemblances with the leadership theory of Park Chung-Hee. On June 16, 1961, only a month after seizing power in the May 16th Coup, Park published a pamphlet entitled *Way to Leadership*. In this, he proposes nine qualifications requisite to a leader, the second of which, 'judgement and problem-solving ability,' curiously corresponds with Yong-Gi Cho's pragmatic pneumatology, or to put it more correctly, his pneumatic pragmatics. He writes:

> "Understanding the problems properly is the true key to their solution. However good the medicine or treatment you receive is, if the diagnosis is wrong, it will only serve to make your illness worse. Once you discard any pretense to reign over others, and instead take up comradery with the people, you will be able to properly grasp what it is that the people feel, what they need, and what they are trying to avoid. As the wants of people who are led are not always rational, you should kindly point out these contradictions and irrationality so that they become aware of them, you must also have the ability to actively lead them to avoid these pitfalls (…). A leader needs the acumen to decide the priority of problems that need to be solved, as well as to judge through what methods, and to what extent they should be resolved. You must have ardor for problem-solving as well as elasticity in method" (Chung-Hee Park, 1961: 19-20).

The beginnings of leadership are deemed to be contemporaneous with the precise recognition of the emotions, desires, fears, as well as aversions of the governed. The leader must listen firsthand to the 'hearts' of his followers, and must persuade them directly. What he suggests as the next task is 'deciding the priority of problems that need to be solved' as well as the methods of solving them. While social mechanisms such as the public sphere and democratic communication systems are practically precluded, the leader's agency is magnified to the extent that he is supposed to enliven social desire (symbolized later in Park's 'Let's live well' slogan), and additionally to meet the needs and solve the problems of the people, through his own judgement.[13] To Park, a leader was, in essence, a 'problem solver' or a 'trouble-shooter'. In this respect, Park and Cho share a fundamental outlook with which to govern their own world, with the exception of one crucial issue: that of determining who is the ultimate

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[12] He compares the church to a "spiritual restaurant" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 26). That is, people come to church in order to satisfy their desires. His defining the Full Gospel as "the gospel which feeds those who visit the church in hunger with the bread of life" occurs in the same context (Yong-Gi Cho, 1997: 10). Sermons must "fulfill the needs of the people" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 29). In fact, according to research by Myung-Soo Park, the principal motivation of those who joined the Full Gospel Church was "for the sake of solving problems that they are wrestling with in reality" and required the church to understand this "desperate reality" (Myung-Soo Park, 2014: 122-3).

[13] "If society were an ocean of oil to be set ablaze, [it would be] the mythical action that ignites it" (Chung-Hee Park, 1961: 10); "The value of a leader is dependent on the extent to which they respond to demands of the people" (Chung-Hee Park, 1961: 11).

agent of solving a given problem. Needless to say, for Park this is the figure of the 'sovereign leader.' He has the appearance of, to follow Carl Schmitt's definition, a sovereign "who decides on the exception" (Schmitt, 1985: 5). In cases where a problem situation is judged as 'crisis of survival', the leader must make a decision, and absorb all types of uncertainties into himself. The leader as a problem-solver, in this sense, can be transformed into the sovereign, and in reality, Park did so in the 1970s through his choice of 'dictatorship' as an embodiment of state sovereignty under the Yushin(維新) constitution (Hong-Jung Kim, 2018: 16-7). Contrastingly, Yong-Gi Cho did not think of himself as the 'solver.' Though he strived to fulfill the needs of the people, the ultimate solving agency is ascribed to the Holy Spirit.

In Protestantism after Calvin, the 'absolute sovereignty' of God is widely acknowledged as part of its central doctrine. As Weber's analysis has shown lucidly, Calvin's predestination excluded *a priori* the possibility of salvation by human actions. Cho subscribed to this idea of divine sovereignty, without any protest. He declares categorically that God is the "absolute sovereign that governs life and death, fortune and misfortune" (CCS 3: 168). The determination of our own status (Yong-Gi Cho, 2004: 36), the judgement of right and wrong (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 71), the foundation of the gospel (Yong-Gi Cho, 1998b: 15), our salvation (CCS 4: 151), even "the rise and fall of the state and the nation" (CCS 4: 105) belong under the jurisdiction of the absolute sovereign.

However, in contrast to the Calvinist God, which remains in complete and incommunicable otherness to the point of absurdity and atrocity, the sovereign Holy Spirit conceived by Cho appears, works, speaks, moves, affects the realities, intervening in the temporal and existential horizon occupied by human beings. As it is well known, Pentecostal doctrine posits that God has a personality and is subject to fellowship. In the principal text of the Pentecostal church, Acts, the Holy Spirit appears as a "rushing mighty wind," and with "divided tongues, as of fire" (Acts 2:2-3), assuming the form of materialized energy. Pastor Cho, in experiencing healing and miracles through being filled with the Holy Spirit while ministering, also assigns the mighty agency of the Holy Spirit a central role in problem-solving. It is true that he stresses the personal fellowship with the Holy Spirit (Yong-Gi Cho, 1998b: 21-6; CCS 4: 44-8), but stronger emphasis is repetitively placed on the fact that Holy Spirit is fundamentally the 'ability' and the 'resources' of life.

"The Kingdom of Heaven is in the ability" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1968a: 108).

"The Holy Spirit is a **problem-solving Spirit** (…). As long as we are living in this world, even Christians cannot avoid life's countless problems. However, when we are filled with the Spirit the following problems are solved, and we are able to pursue a life of victory" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1983: 132. Emphasis added).

"The Holy Spirit imparts in you the ability to achieve your hopes and dreams" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 19).

"The answer to life's problems are found in attendance of the Holy Spirit" (CCS:145).

"I am a 'success,' who has taken Jesus Christ as his sole wealth in all facets of life" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1995: 113).

The Holy Spirit functions as the vanishing point in the overall dynamics of the theology of problems. It is believed to absorb all of man's acrid problems entrusted to it, and to nullify or dissolve them. The Holy Spirit acts, surging through human actors, transforming their hearts and bodies, filling them with ecstasy (CCS 4: 307). The sermons and doctrines of the Full Gospel are ultimately oriented towards the power of this "problem-solving Spirit." Undoubtedly, it is due to this intrinsic propensity that the Full Gospel doctrine was accused of being a mere *kratophanic* religion fetishizing and instrumentalizing the Holy Spirit in a cult of the power, instead of being a 'genuine' *hierophanic* religion searching for the sacred, properly speaking (Jin-Hong Chung, 1981: 119-120). In spite of being aware of these criticisms directed to his theory, Cho continued to accentuate this hyper-pragmatic pneumatology, and in the same vein he gave prominence to the centrality of direct and intimate fellowship with the Holy Spirit understood in such a way. He never ceased to publicly confess that he is in close communion with the Spirit in quotidian settings, praying for and listening to it habitually. It was only through the command and authority of the Spirit, he often says, that he could acquire the courage to embark upon a number of risky enterprises, ranging from his Church on Yoido to international missionary work (International Theological Study Institute, 2008: 394-5, 401-2).

Given this paramount importance of the problem-solving Spirit, the concrete method of communicating with it remains to be established for the theology of problems. How does one come into contact with the Spirit, how does one use the Spirit (as a resource) ? What is the channel to it? To this Pastor Cho answers: through the dream. Those who dream meet the Holy Spirit and survive.

Those who dream, survive.

Yong-Gi Cho's theology of problems is representative of the dream of Korean society during the Cold War era. The numerous conceptual devices put to use in his theology such as the Good God, the three-fold blessing, and the problem-solving spirit, aptly reflected the hope for a better life that was prevalent during that era. Then, as Korean society faced serious economic crisis in the late 90s, what vision did Pastor Cho's theology put forth about this 'crisis of survival?' Interestingly enough, in the years following 1997 the topic of 'dreams' often re-appeared in Cho's sermons. Of these, the sermon from August 23rd, 1998 is particularly worthy of being noted in the context of our discussion. The title of the sermon was "Those who dream, survive." In contemplating the overlap of personal and national crises, he finds the possibility of overcoming these in the organization of collective psychology and collective desire. "Currently, our homeland is passing through a tunnel darker than dark. Hardship and adversity are engulfing our lives like the waves. **In order to weather this storm and survive, there is but one path: to hold fast to the dream that God gives us, and to fervently sing songs of hope**" (Yong-Gi Cho, 2012: 46. Emphasis added).

In fact, this notion of the dream had already been defining part of his theology from the

late 1960s. To him, dreams were not a decoration of life, but an indispensable ingredient of existence, precisely because they were the means of communication with the Spirit. He asserts that typical modes of manifestation of the Holy Spirit are "dream, vision, and voice" (CSS 3: 278): "Dream and vision are the spiritual language of Holy Spirit. He continues to imbue you with dreams and visions inside of your heart, and speak to you through them" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1979: 44). Thus, visions and dreams make up a "language of the fourth dimension" (Yong-Gi Cho, 1979: 44) and were the media through which God worked (CSS 2:349).

In consideration of this reiterated evaluation of the gravity of dreams for mutual communication with the problem-solving Spirit, it is possible to say that the act of dreaming for Cho is not to be categorized under the simple name of 'optimism' but rather under the oxymoron of 'desperate optimism'. This suggests that it is charged with an obsessive, rather than hedonistic character, that it is not so much a safeguard of the positive but rather the fervent expression of anxiety about the negative, in short, indicating an attitude of 'anti-pessimism'. "If with a negative heart and with resentment one laments and follows the dark, the Holy Spirit will cease to exist (…). As God is a bright, clear, and gleaming spirit, he does not work in those who carry resentment and complaint, with a negative and sighing heart (…). Lamenting with a negative heart is to dig one's own grave" (CCS 4: 51). The quintessential form of evil that Pastor Cho strives to exorcise is that of 'hopelessness' or 'dreamlessness.' His constant message, running from the 60s until the late 90s is that a man or a nation who has no dream will undoubtedly fail (Yong-Gi Cho, 1968b: 3; CCS 2: 245). Within this message there is a deep-seated psycho-social complex indicative of the fear of collapse and need for survival.

From this, the type of human that the Full Gospel ventures to 'subjectify' can be deduced. That is a fundamentally dual subjectivity traversed by radical passivity and extreme activity. The logic lies in the dialectics of destruction and revival of the ego effectuated under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The procedures are composed of the following two consecutive steps.

The first step is the destruction of the self. Namely, to become an authentic Full Gospel subject, one should assume radical passivity in regard to their relationship with the transcendental Spirit; one should experience, among other things, the "destruction of the ego" (CSS 6: 101), in confrontation with sovereign God. They should accept that in the profound presence of the authority of the Transcendent, one's power and ability is no less than 'nothing'. One should be convinced of the fact that they can do nothing and all must be left up to God. In this intense psychic process of self-annihilation founded on the acute recognition of the absolute sovereignty of Holy Spirit, the subjectivity of the believer shifts away of ego-centered being to a totally passive one, inexorably dependent on God (CCS 5: 214). "When the ego breaks and everything is surrendered to God, what type of person will you become? You will change as Jacob changed to Israel. Jacob was an active man (…). However, when he became Israel he came to pieces before God (…) he lived a life dependent on Jehovah" (CCS 5: 214).

However, this extreme passivity is not to be misunderstood as a simple lethargy. For those who surrender their own ego thoroughly to the sovereign God unfolds the path of capturing and making good use of the pragmatic and powerful resources of problem-solving Spirit[14]. He

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[14] In the theology of Cho we can find a kind of economy of blessing. That is to say, the blessing of Holy Spirit is practiced in

is given anew an inner power to project himself positively into the future; endowed with a novel vision and dream which fascinates, encourages, and excites him. According to Cho's theory, in this process of infiltration of Holy Spirit into the hearts of those who kneel before the absoluteness of God, a certain transubstantiation of human subjectivity takes place. The passive man who forfeits his power to God becomes a more reinforced and active man as a consequence of the blessing. Once blessed, he makes a sharp about-face; he rises out of his depressive state, is rehabilitated, revived, and fortified.

Thereafter emerge 'radical agents' armed with 'extreme agency.' To this agent, the motivation for reflection, doubt, or introspection is remarkably weak. The conviction of faith hastens him towards a goal authorized by the Holy Spirit. His belief of 'I can do it' allows him to challenge impossibility, and achieve it. Yong-Gi Cho's theology of problems optimizes human's capacity to act through a magnificent dialectics of action and passivity. If Calvin thwarted the possibility of salvation by means of human's actions, then Pastor Cho approved of and encouraged a fierce 'can-doist' subjectivity. Holy Spirit of Full Gospel fulfilled a function of Korean capitalist spirit, and this type of subjectivity becomes the hero of Korean modernity. We are drawn to say that Korean modernity was constructed by this type of extreme actor, and that the diagram of it is to be found not in Panopticon-like institutions illustrated by Foucault, but rather in Full Gospel church which was successful in producing superlatively active agents.

Conclusion

I have hitherto analyzed the theology of Pastor Yong-Gi Cho as a manifestation which reveals the grammar characterizing Korean survivalist modernity. Cho's theology of problems is inextricably intertwined with the socio-historic context of modern Koreans' psycho-scape, and is founded on the collective aspiration for the survival. He succeeded in creating a typically Korean Christian theology *par excellence*, by combining the Pentecostal spirituality with his own findings on the structure of desires held by Koreans in the post-war era. Passing through the period of industrialization, he carved out the developmentalist spirituality by the adept reinterpretation of Christian doctrines: the three-fold blessing, God Good, and the problem-solving Spirit. These theories functioned as discursive and practical device (*dispositif*) electrifying human agents with feverish motivation for the better life, in offering to them emotional motors (hopes), epistemic legitimation (theological justification of their actions),

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conformity with the law of equivalent exchange; man gives to God the most precious thing to acquire his grace, firmly believing that God never fails to repay. This kind of give-and-take relationship with the transcendental is closely associated with the imaginary of the investment: "If you invest into God's enterprise, our bountiful God will, without a doubt, multiply your profits by 30, 60, and even 100 times over. After borrowing a boat from Peter to teach upon, Jesus repaid him by filling it to the brim with fish. When the Spirit speaks within your heart, do not hesitate, but follow his work and invest in God's enterprise. There is no safer investment than this, for the Lord does not incur debt" (CCA 2: 266). In addition to this, Cho presents an interesting paradox. According to it, we can be blessed only when we sacrifice everything. Cho declares, "Never seek the benefits from God, only then may you reap such benefits" (CCS 2: 270). A strange code of conduct is recommended here; we should be rational enough not to be too rational; we should be calculative enough not to be too calculative; and we should be interested in the blessing, however staying careful to not be too interested in it. A specific attitude of 'as if' is internal to this logic. To be granted God's grace, we need to behave ourselves as if we are not conscious of it at all.

and will or desire to prosper. Viewed from this angle, Yong-Gi Cho is a prototypical producer and designer of the survivalist dream of Korean modernity. He dreamt of a utopia, a primarily Christian one. However, implications of it overflow such religious boundaries, for it affected society and is influenced by it simultaneously. It was a dream of healing from the survival shock, of victory over all types of possible survival problems, and of transcending this-worldly precariousness, whether it be political, economic, or existential. It is not a 'religious' religion, but a 'civil' religion of modern Korean society that Cho's theology manifested: a religion of development encapsulating the everlasting dream of survival.

How do rationality and empathy deal with "well-being" and "well-dying" in organ transplant and life-prolonging medication?

Yoshihide Sakurai

Hokkaido University, Japan

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outline

- Episode 1 Natural science oriented University
  - Bio Medical science and technology
- Episode 2
  - Chimera pig with human organs Regenerative medical technology: ES cell and IPS cell
  - *The Bladerunner* 1974 and 2017
  - *Never Let Me Go* by Kazuo Ishiguro
- Episode 3
  - Organ transplant
  - Life prolong treatment
- Episode 4
  - Great Earth Quake and radioactive ash in 2011
  - Ghost sighting and communication with the dead

Theoretical question:

- Recognition, time, and modernity
  - Forward looking vs standing, backward reflection

  - Homogeneous and chronological time vs heterogeneous and reflexive time

  - Reconsideration of Modernity
    - Personal level: medical development and obscuration in quality of life and death
    - Societal level: gap between objective well-being and subjective one
    - State level: looming crisis of financial collapse

Episode 1 Natural science oriented University

- Policy for university by MEXT
  - Functional enhancement in particular science
  - Triage of particular universities

- Case of Hokkaido University
  - Bio Medical science and technology
    - Fundraising in MEXT and industries
  - No comprehensive social design
    - Passive reaction to globalization
    - Freeze on economic development by IT, AI, and bio science
    - Poor imagination on aging and depopulating society

Episode 2: Chimera pig with human organs Regenerative medical technology: ES cell and IPS cell

The Bladerunner 1974, 2017

synthetic humans known as replicants are bioengineered by the powerful Tyrell Corporation

Memory, Reality, and Sense of human

Memory of Hailsham
    Mission of specialty: Gift
    Grown-up organ transplant
    Care for givers, then
    become a giver.

Boys and girls with emotion
and sense originated by
Embryo-stem cell

    total control

    teachers' conflict

    fatal gift and meaning of
life and death

"A page-turner and a heartbreaker, a tour de force of knotted tension and buried anguish." —*TIME*

Never Let Me Go

Winner of the NOBEL PRIZE® in Literature

Kazuo Ishiguro
AUTHOR OF *THE REMAINS OF THE DAY*

Summary 1

- Forward looking vs standing, backward reflection
  - Medical development and desire for anti-aging and immortality
  - At the same time ethical question was raised

- Homogeneous and chronological time vs heterogeneous and reflexive time
  - Science and technology improve our lives
  - Through reflective time and memory we realize a sense of life

- Reconsideration of Modernity
  - Science fiction raised question about regenerative life and existence

# Act on brain death and organ transplant

From several days to a year

- 1997
  - Act on brain death and organ transplant was enacted to enable organs transplant from brain dead patients.
- 2009
 - Amended to enable family to be substitute decision-maker, if the donor is under fifteen.

Transplant recipients and supporters

| Brain death | Medicalized and contingent death | Heart death |

Cultural and religious critics

9

臓器提供件数の年次推移
Change of organ donation

（件）

- ■〈改正法〉心停止下提供件数（N=298）
- ■〈旧法〉心停止下提供件数（N＝1,291）
- ■〈改正法〉脳死下提供件数（N＝337）
- ■〈旧法〉脳死下提供件数（N＝86）

改正法施行

臓器移植法施行

Heart death

Brain death

＊1995年は、日本腎臓移植ネットワーク発足後の4～12月

JOT NW

Life prolong (support) treatment

- Life support
  - performed in an emergency to support life after the failure of one or more vital organs
- Life support for agers
  - Artificial feeding by gastrostomy, nasogastric, and intravenous nutrition.
  - Artificial breathing

.

From several months to several years

LS recipients and families

| Life support | Medicalized and contingent living | Heart death |

Critics to seek national death

11

Change of mortality since Meiji to Heisei

死亡の動き　General mortality

死亡数は前年を上回る
80% of Japanese will die over 65 years of age, and 50% over 80 years.

死亡数及び死亡率の年次推移—明治32～平成24年—
Trends in deaths and death rates, 1899—2012

12

Medical process in the final stage of our lives

Treatment policy making

- Confirmation of patients
- Well informed

No confirmation

No substituting

- decision made by family instead

- Committee such as medical professionals and social worker

Advice and suggestion

13

Increase of palliative care center

届出施設数　施設累計

日本ホスピス緩和ケア協会　緩和ケア病棟届出施設の推移・累計施設数　HP
http://www.hpcj.org/what/pcu_sii.html

14

Summary 2

- Forward looking vs standing, backward reflection
  - Medical technology changed the time of dying and obscuration of living/dying
  - Advanced care planning and peoples' will for dignity death will gradually change technology-imposed medical treatment

- Homogeneous and chronological time vs heterogeneous and reflexive time
  - Realization of a last time changes mechanical life to human
  - Existence of our lives are in our memories

- Reconsideration of Modernity

Great Earth Quake and radioactive ash in 2011

Onagawa city 2018 and 2011

**Fukushima nuclear power station 2011 and 2018**

Ghost sighting and communication with the deads

Clinical religious master

- Since 2011
  - Engaged Buddhists
  - Clinical religious outreach for suffering people by active-listening on bed and café.
  - Satoshi Numaguchi, managed Amitaba, hospice supported by five monks.
  - Over 200 monks certificated as clinical religious master at Tohoku University.

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
Summary 3

- Forward looking vs standing, backward reflection
  - Disaster reconstruction and economic prosperity are still our national ideology, however, deliberative democratic consensus on its methodology was not accomplished

- Homogeneous and chronological time vs heterogeneous and reflexive time
  - Survivors experience and realize the past, present, and future through story-telling in various occasions

- Reconsideration of Modernity
  - Japanese begins to think of modernity, reflecting 70 years of history which includes development, stagnant, and obscure future

No concluding but continuous thinking

- The scientific and technological rationality have been realized to have limitations due to the formation of society and human being, especially when society and human face the limit of growth and continuity.
- Although Japanese politician, bureaucrats, and business leaders still keep the memory of success since W.W.Two and challenging mindset in global competitive market, one third of Japanese, graying generation has gradually realized that our consciousness of rationality and chronological time are the product of the development times and it is not always appropriate to the other times and conditions.
- The essence of sociology which was originated from modernity will be reconsidered from the experience of our trendy, post industrialization-commercialization-information society, and from the human receptivity and reflection in our lives.

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